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FTC Regulation of Endorsements in Advertising:
In the Consumer's Behalf?.
The Federal Trade Commission as recently as 1980, has issued Guides
designed to prevent deception of consumers due to misleading product en-
dorsement advertising by celebrities and others. The new Guides indicate
that the FTC intends to continue its recent trend offinding advertisers and
even endorsers liable for deceptive endorsement practices. However, a crit-
ical analysis of the Guides, in light of marketplace realities and consumer
needs, raises serious question as to whether they are likely to promote ac-
curate endorsement advertising.
This comment will explore pre-1980 regulations and trace the progres-
sion of controls through the advent of the FTC Guides. The Guides will be
analyzed in light of past and present case law and alternative controls
will be surveyed. Recommendations concerning the Guides will be sug-
gested. The most important of these is a change from the present narrow
and restrictive interpretive rules, which lack the force of law, to more gen-
era substantive rules, which could be strictly enforced. The prospects for
their implementation, however, appear dismal due to inertia within the
FTC and federal budgetary reductions proposed by the current Adminis-
tration.
I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, entrepreneurs have tried to persuade others to
buy their goods and services. They have used practically every
means imaginable to achieve this end. One tried and proven
method of selling has been to use the endorsements of influencial
people.' With advances in communications technologies, adver-
1. The American Association of Advertising Agencies (AAAA) has said the
following with regard to endorsements:
Endorsements are a valuable technique for communicating product claims
to consumers, adapting "word of mouth"--the user's own experience with
the product-to a mass audience. The technique itself is neutral. It is not
unfair or deceptive unless used to mislead. It does not convey product su-
periority unless a claim of superiority is expressly made or may be rea-
sonably inferred from the advertisement as a whole. It does present the
testimony of persons who use a product to other persons who are or may
be interested in using the product themselves. When this testimony is
true and fairly presented, the technique benefits the public as well as the
advertiser.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF ADVERTISING AGENCIES, COMMENTS ON FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION'S PROPOSED GUIDES CONCERNING USE OF ENDORSEMENTS AND TESTI-
MONIALs IN ADVERTISING (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 AAAA COMMENTS] (on
fie, Pepperdine Law Review Office). Another writer has said that
[a]ny endorsement has an impact on a consumer's decision to make a
purchase. A recommendation by the salesman at the point of purchase
("I am hot just saying this to make a sale; I drive one myself, you know")
tisers are now able to reach much wider audiences with greater
impact than in the past.2 In recent years, advertisements fre-
quently feature celebrities. 3 Organizations also assist sales cam-
paigns by granting endorsements. Advertisers have been quick to
recognize the increased influence which endorsements from these
sources can add.
The use of endorsements, however, has its abuses. Even before
the advent of modern communication methods, it was common
for promotions to use untrue or unauthorized statements in order
to sell products.4 Pressure for governmental intervention to stem
these abuses has grown greatly in recent years.5
With the organization of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
in 1914, came the hope that many ills in the business world would
be cured. The FTC is now recognized as having authority to regu-
late advertising through its power over "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices" in trade.6 In response to endorsement advertising
problems, the FTC has taken an active role in policing the content
of promotional campaigns. Restraints have been imposed upon
advertisers under the theory that it is against public policy to al-
affects the decisional process. So does a casual comment that Blasto gets
the dirt out. A celebrity's endorsement has at least a similar impact. For
example, if famed American football player John Unitas worked as a
salesman at a sporting goods store and recommended a particular football
shoe to a shopper, his recommendation probably would influence the
shopper.
Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51
TEX. L. REV. 637, 645 (1973). This comment uses the term "endorsement" to refer
to statements, actions, or circumstances in advertisements which imply that a'par-
ticular person or organization, acting independently to at least some extent,. finds
a product worthy of purchase. The term also encompasses the frequently used
word "testimonial." The two terms can usually be interchanged.
2. The advances referred to include the printing press, radio, and television.
Communications prior to these advances were primarily either oral or handwrit-
ten; it is now possible for a single person to speak to millions. Businesses, of
course, have taken advantage of the communications developments as media for
advertisements.
3. In re Cooga Mooga and Charles E. Boone, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 531, 533 (1980).
Endorsement of products by celebrities has become a way of advertising
life, for a famous name or face has greater potential for catching a pur-
chaser's eye and can do so more effectively than the ordinary housewife
character. Catherine Deneuve endorses perfume. O.J. Simpson pushes a
fast rental car service. Joe DiMaggio bustles with coffee in the kitchen,
and James Garner takes pictures for a camera company.
Id.
4. See, e.g., Treece, supra note 1.
5. See generally Hammer, FTC Knights and Consumer Daze: The Regulation
of Deceptive or Unfair Advertising, 32 ARK. L. REV. 446 (1978).
6. See Marinelli, The Federal Trade Commission's Authority to Determine Un-
fair Practices and Engage in Substantive Rule Making, 2 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 289,
294-95 (1974).
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low anyone to profit through the use of deceptive advertising.7
In 1972, the FTC released proposed endorsement Guides8 with
the intent of reducing public deception due to unscrupulous or
careless endorsement advertising. Although final versions of the
Guides 9 were issued in 1980, it is not too early to analyze what ef-
fect they will have.
This comment will analyze the new Guides, their narrow re-
quirements, and other problems which indicate that they are not
likely to prove effective in controlling endorsement advertising
abuses. Private, state, and alternative FTC actions will be ex-
amined in an attempt to find more effective solutions. In particu-
lar, the replacement of the current Guides, which are only inter-
pretive and lack the force of law, with more general substantive
rules, accompanied by strict enforcement, will be suggested as an
appropriate corrective measure.
II. THE NATURE OF THE ENDORSEMENT ADVERTISING PROBLEM
The use of endorsements in sales promotions did not become
widespread until mass communications methods were developed;
previously, sellers had been limited to face-to-face discussions
concerning their wares. Today, new media such as newspapers,
radio, and television allow communication to much wider audi-
ences. Advertising has become more impersonal and has devel-
oped into a societal force of great impact.' 0 Direct contact
7. See, e.g., Neuvill, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 436, 442-43 (1956). The following language
from Neuville is fairly typical of that found in untrue endorsement cases:
The acts and practices of respondents, as hereinabove found, have had
and now have the tendency and capacity to mislead and deceive members
of the purchasing public with respect to the usual and regular retail prices
of their hosiery, and to mislead and deceive dealers, retailers and mem-
bers of the purchasing public with respect to the designation "Academy
Award," thereby inducing the purchase of substantial quantities of their
products. As a result, substantial trade in commerce has been and is be-
ing unfairly diverted to respondents from their competitors and substan-
tial injury has been and is being done to competition in commerce.
Id.
8. FTC Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Adver-
tising, 16 C.F.R. § 255 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Guides].
9. FTC Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Adver-
tising, 16 C.F.R. § 255 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Guides].
10. See generally Reed & Coalson, Eighteenth-Century Legal Doctrine Meets
Twentieth-Century Marketing Techniques: F.T.C. Regulation of Emotionally Con-
ditioning Advertising, 11 GA. L. REV. 733 (1977).
between a seller and a potential buyer is no longer necessarily
present in the promotion of goods.
The impersonal nature of modern advertising helped provide
the needed forum for endorsement advertising. Celebrities and
expert endorsements, therefore, naturally followed the growth of
mass media advertising, becoming effective promotional tools.
However, claims have been made, even during the early days of
mass media, that many advertising endorsements are either with-
out foundation or are fraudulent. 1 '
Endorsers have gradually come to be categorized into four
groups: (1) celebrities and well-known persons; (2) experts; (3)
consumer endorsers; and (4) organizations. 12 Celebrities and
other well-known people are those immediately recognized by the
public. While such persons usually possess no special skills con-
cerning the products they endorse, their presence in advertise-
ments increases public attention.' 3 Experts, though not
renowned, establish that the products being advertised are of
high quality. To cause the public to be aware of an expert's sta-
tus, such advertisements either explicitly state or strongly imply
that the endorser is an expert.14 Consumer endorsers are those
who are portrayed in advertisements as current users of the
goods or services being advertised. 15 Organizations, such as test-
ing companies and athletic or consumer associations, have also
been used extensively in advertising. Approval by a supposedly
credible organization increases a product's sales.16
It is important to distinguish endorsers from those generally re-
11. See, e.g., Von Theodorovich v. Franz Josef Beneficial Ass'n, 154 F.2d 911
(E.D. Pa. 1907). The defendant association was epjoined from use of an emperor's
name and picture in advertisements and letterheads so as to not deceive any por-
.tion of the public.
12. 1980 Guides, supra note 9, at Introduction.
13. The celebrity's fame need not in any way relate to what is being adver-
tised. However, a celebrity often will possess expertise regarding the endorsed
product, such as would be the case if a professional race car driver were to en-
dorse a sports car.
14. An expert for endorsement advertising purposes has been defined as "an
individual, group or institution possessing, as a result of experience, study or
training, knowledge of a particular subject which knowledge is superior to that
generally acquired by ordinary individuals." FTC Guides Concerning Use of En-
dorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(d) (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1975 Guides].
15. Consumer endorsers need not be recognized by the public or possess any
expertise. There are, however, issues concerning the use of actors in advertise-
ments and how they fit into this analysis. See notes 193-96 infra and accompany-
ing text.
16. Organizational endorsements are distinguished from "experts" in that an
organization can endorse a product without having any expertise concerning it.
For example, a basketball team could permit the use of its name and logo in
hamburger advertisements.
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ferred to as spokespersons.' 7 An endorser is one who vouches for
a product and attempts to persuade others to purchase the en-
dorsed product. Endorsers are almost invariable portrayed as in-
dependent of the organization for which the advertising is being
done.' 8 In contrast, a spokesperson is one who appears in adver-
tising merely to represent the product being advertised.19 The
spokesperson is usually not recognized by the public and makes
no claims of any special expertise.
It is considered inconsequential whether a spokesperson is ac-
tually connected with the company for which advertising is being
done or is merely a "hired gun" representing the advertiser's
product. It is assumed that a spokesperson will be viewed as an
agent of the advertiser and thus, will not be able to exert any spe-
cial influence over the public.20 In contrast, an endorser is pre-
sumed not to be connected with the advertiser and, therefore, can
be more convincing when vouching for a product's qualities. The
key difference between the endorser and the spokesperson is that
the spokesperson personally presents no distinctive trait lending
credibility to the product being promoted. The spokesperson the-
oretically presents less opportunity for abuse because of the
lesser influence which he exerts. Consequently, there is little
controversy over the use of spokespersons. 2'
Though types of endorsers may differ substantially, their effect
upon the public has generally been considered to be similar. All
four types are assumed to have the common element of being
able to influence consumers in some of their purchasing deci-
sions.22 Therein lies the potential for abuse with endorsements.-
The temptation to use endorsements may be so great that en-
17. 1980 Guides, supra note 9, at Supplementary Information.
18. Whether or not the portrayal of independence is authentic is another mat-
ter. This is usually one of the key issues in endorsement problems. See notes 158-
71 infra and accompanying text.
19. Admittedly, the distinctions are somewhat difficult to make. However, the
FTC has seen fit to exempt spokespersons from the scrutiny through which en-
dorsers must pass under the new FTC Guides.
20. In fact, most frequently, the public will assume that the spokesperson is
connected with the advertiser.
21. The comparative inability of spokespersons to influence the public is as-
sumed to be the reason the FrC has exempted them from the new Guides. The
FTC is primarily concerned about deception of the public and it must have con-
cluded that spokespersons present little threat of such deception.
22. Case law does not tend to emphasize differences in the types of endorsers
but rather examines the effect which they have upon the public and competition.
See, e.g., Cooga Mooga, 92 F.T.C. 310, 317-18 (1978).
dorsements may be used even if untrue. This was especially true
in the past when advertisements were lightly scrutinized, if at all,
by the government and consumer groups.
The general reasoning finding untruthful endorsement to be un-
desirable has been that such endorsements deceive the public
and harm competition.23 Advertising provides information to con-
sumers to aid in the rational allocation of scarce resources in a
free enterprise economy. Consumers are thus enabled to make
wise and fully informed choices among competing goods.24 How-
ever, it is also generally accepted that for our free enterprise sys-
tem to work well, advertising information must be accurate.
Many commentators have argued that there has been a major fail-
ure in advertising to provide that accurate information.25 Their
arguments center upon the self-serving nature of advertising.
Critics question the motivation of businesses in disclosing any
more than necessary to the buying public without external com-
pulsion.
Although very little has been written regarding the matter, one
major area of inaccuracy in advertising is that involving endorse-
ments.26 The special positions which endorsers occupy in society
enable greater influence to be achieved over the buying public.27
Therefore, deception of the public through misleading endorse-
ments is an important societal concern. The concern for prevent-
ing deception of the public has been the FTC's chief motivating
factor in controlling advertising, as will be demonstrated in the
following sections.
III. EVOLUTION OF FTC POWER OVER ENDORSEMENT ADVERTISING
A. Early FTC Intervention Into Advertising
In 1914, Congress responded to the need for federal business
regulation by passing the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC
Act),2 8 under which the Federal Trade Commission was estab-
lished. Section 5 of the Act gave the FTC power over "unfair
23. Note 7 supra.
24. See Bernacchi, Advertising and Its Discretionary Control by the FTC: A
Need for Empirically Based Criteria, 52 J. URB. L. 223, 228 (1974). A list of sup-
posed benefits derived from advertising is presented.
25. See, e.g., Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation
of Advertising, 90 HARv. L. REV. 661 (1977). Pitofsky argues that the free market
system has failed to provide consumers with correct information.
26. This conclusion is strongly supported in the introduction by the rc of its
new endorsement Guides.
27. See Treece, supra note 1, at 645.
28. Pub. 203, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 41
(1976)).
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methods of competition in commerce." 29 Though the Act did not
explicitly give the FTC jurisdiction to regulate advertising, three
of the five complaints it considered during its first year of opera-
tion were directed at false advertising.30 Its advertising powers,
however, were gradually restricted.
In FTC v. Gratz,31 the first FTC case to reach the United States
Supreme Court, it was held that the FTC's power to issue cease
and desist orders 32 was valid only if courts had previously deter-
mined that the acts sought to be regulated were against public
policy. This restrictive holding allowed control of only those busi-
ness practices which had been found by courts to be harmful to
competition.33
FTC v. Winsted Hoisery Co.3 4 was the first FTC case to come
before the Supreme Court which specifically concerned advertis-
ing. The FrC was seeking to regulate Winsted Hoisery's use of
clothing labels which it considered to be deceptive. The labels,
which used terms such as "Australian wool," implied that the
clothing was pure wool though it actually contained only a small
amount. Though the FTC's power to regulate the labels was up-
held, the Court looked not to the ill effect of the labels upon con-
sumers, but rather to how the labels affected other businesses.
The harm to competitors was emphasized. The Court felt com-
pelled to examine cases such as this for negative effects upon
competition because of the wording in section 5 of the FTC Act
regarding "unfair methods of competition."a5
The greatest restriction for the FTC came in 1931 in FTC v.
Raladam Co.36 There, a manufacturer of an "obesity cure" was
ordered by the FTC to cease misrepresenting that its product was
an effective remedy for obesity. The Supreme Court held that the
FTC was without jurisdiction 37 unless it could establish that (1)
the methods of marketing complained of were unfair; (2) they
29. 15 U.S.C. § 42 (1976).
30. See generally Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Adver-
tising, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 439 (1964). The FrC considered itself from its origin to
have jurisdiction over advertising, though the assumption has not always been
shared by the courts.
31. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
32. See notes 68-72 infra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 42-48 infra and accompanying text.
34. 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
35. Id. at 489.
36. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
37. See note 63 infra and accompanying text.
were methods of competition; and (3) an FTC proceeding was in
the public interest. The Court assumed the first and third ele-
ments but remanded the case for a determination on the issue of
competition. 38 It held that there must be a showing of substantial
competition, present or potential, and injury. Jurisdiction could
not be maintained without proving the necessary element of com-
petition, regardless of how great any harm might have been to the
public. 39
In 1938, the Supreme Court decision of FTC v. R.F. Keppel &
Bros. 40 introducted a new era of increased FTC power. Keppel in-
volved a candy manufacturer who allegedly competed unfairly by
selling candy which varied in size and contained concealed prizes.
The Court stated that determinations made by the FTC, a "body
specially competent to deal with" business problems, would be
given great weight.4 1 Thus, the strict requirements of Raladam
were relaxed, so that the FTC was not required to prove abso-
lutely that competition would be harmed by the conduct sought to
be regulated.
The passage of the Wheeler-Lea Act of 193842 signaled congres-
sional approval of a more active role for the FTC in the regulation
of advertising. Section 5 of the FTC Act, originally prohibiting
only "unfair methods of competition," 43 was amended by the 1938
enactment to empower the FTC to regulate "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices."44 Additionally, the FrC was explicitly given
38. 283 U.S. at 646-67.
39. Id. at 646-49. The Raladam decision had major impact upon the FTC. One
writer has referred to the decision as "potentially catastrophic." Elrod, The Fed-
eral Trade Commission: Deceptive Advertising and the Colgate-Polmolive Com-
pany, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 133, 135 (1973). The Raladam Court's rigid thinking is
evidenced by the following.
Findings of the Commission justify the conclusion that the advertise-
ments naturally would tend to increase the business of respondent; but
there is neither finding nor evidence from which the conclusion legiti-
mately can be drawn that these advertisements substantially injured or
tended thus to injure the business or any competitor or of competitors
generally, whether legitimate or not. None of the supposed competitors
appeared or was called upon to show what, if any, effect the misleading
advertisements had, or were likely to have, upon his business. The only
evidence as to the existence of competitors comes from medical sources
not engaged in making or selling "obesity cures," and consists in the main
of a list of supposed producers and sellers of "anti-fat remedies" compiled
from the files and records of the Bureau of Investigation of the American
Medical Association, a list which appears to have been gathered mainly
from newspapers and advertisements.
283 U.S. at 652-53.
40. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
41. Id. at 314.
42. Ch. 311, § 4, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52-55
(1976)).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
44. Id. at §45(a)(1).
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power over advertising by the newly added section 12,45 which
provided that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, partnership,
or corporation to disseminate . . . any false advertisement ...
[b Iy any means, for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely to
induce, directly or indirectly, the purchase in commerce of food,
drugs, devices or cosmetics."
Congress codified the essence of the Supreme Court's holding
in Keppe14 6 in the Wheeler-Lea Act so that no longer would FTC
jurisdiction depend upon a showing that competition was being
adversely affected. Rather, the FrC could now exercise jurisdic-
tion whenever it could be shown that deception of the public was
likely to occur. The impact of the Wheeler-Lea amendments can-
not be underestimated. The emphasis of the FTC with respect to
advertising was allowed to shift from one of preventing harm to
competition to a concern for protecting the public from decep-
tion.47
The objective of Congress in passing the Wheeler-Lea Act was
to provide the FTC with increased power to regulate advertising.
Congress intended to provide a "definition broad enough to cover
every form of advertising deception over which it would be hu-
manly practicable to exercise government control. It covers every
case of imposition on a purchaser for which there could be a prac-
tical remedy."48 The FrC finally received expansive authority to
effectively police advertising practices.
An understanding of the inner workings of the FTC is essential
to fully appreciate the growth of FTC powers over advertising.
Accordingly, the following section explains administrative law
generally and then outlines those administrative procedures and
remedies which are peculiar to the FTC, as well as its impact
upon state law.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 52(a) (1976).
46. 291 U.S. at 314.
47. See Pitofsky, supra note 25, at 675-76. "Deception" in this context is de-
fined below:
The standard for "deception" has been the "average" or "or-
dinary" person in the audience addressed by the ad, taking
into account that many who may be misled are unsophistica-
ted and unwary. Aside from the "ignorant, the unthinking
and the credulous," an ad may have a greater or lesser capac-
ity to deceive because of the special susceptibility of the tar-
get audience.
Id.
48. H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1937).
B. Administrative Procedures and Remedies
1. General Administrative Law
Administrative law is the law that controls the governmental
machinery necessary for carrying out government programs, in-
cluding those that are regulatory in nature. Sources for adminis-
trative law include constitutions, statutes, common law, and
agency-made law. 49 The last category, with which this article is
concerned, refers to those rules made by agencies while acting in
quasi-legislative50 capacities. Rules issued by administrative
agencies are grouped into three categories: procedural, interpre-
tive, and substantive. Procedural rules describe an administrative
agency's methods of operations and requirements for rulemaking
and adjudicative hearings. Even if an agency is not required to
adopt procedural rules, decisions by the agency will often be re-
versed if it can be shown to not have complied with its own
rules.5 1
Interpretive rules,5 2 in contrast, are those issued by an agency
to serve as guides to its staff and those it regulates regarding the
execution of the statutory mandate of the agency. "An interpreta-
tive rule is a clarification or explanation of existing laws or regula-
tions, rather than a substantive modification of them. [They] are
statements as to what the agency thinks a statute or regulation
means."53 Since an interpretive rule only sets forth an agency's
opinion on the meaning of a statute, the rule is significant but not
necessarily binding upon anyone, and courts are free to substitute
their own understanding of the underlying statute.5 4 Because
they are only advisory in nature, interpretive rules are not consid-
ered to have the force of law.55
Finally, substantive rules 56 of administrative agencies have the
same effect as if they were statutes, and thus, have the force of
law. This means that agency regulations, a form of substantive
law, are enforced and respected by governments as though they
49. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 1-2 (3d ed. 1972).
50. E. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 122 (1972).
51. Id. at 123.
52. K. DAVIS, supra note 49, at 126.
53. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 154 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
54. E. GELLHORN,. supra note 50, at 123-24. An interpretive rule is significant
only in that it indicates how the issuing agency construes the underlying statute
from which it flowed.
55. Id. A rule, which does not have the force of law, is "not binding upon
those affected, for, if there is disagreement with the [issuing] agency's view, the
question can be presented for determination by a court." UNrrED STATES A'roR-
NEY GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 27 (1941).
56. E. GELLHORN, supra note 50, at 122.
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were statutes enacted by legislatures. 5 7 Because substantive
rules are, in effect, administrative statutes, notice to the public
and opportunity for comment must usually precede issuance of
such rules.58 Under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),59 general notice of any proposed substantive rulemaking
must be published in the Federal Register so that interested per-
sons can have the opportunity to submit data or arguments. This
procedure is designed to assure fairness and consideration in the
agency rulemaking process. 60 An issue always to be considered in
evaluating administrative rulemaking is whether the rules in
question have in fact been made pursuant to statutory rulemak-
ing authority.6 1
2. FTC Administrative Procedures and Remedies
The authority of the FTC to regulate advertising is found in sec-
tions 5 and 12 of the FTC Act,62 which prohibit unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce. Before the FTC can proceed in any advertising case, three
basic jurisdictional requirements must be satisfied: (1) the adver-
tisement is one that is "in commerce"; (2) action by the FTC is in
the public interest; and (3) there is an unfair or deceptive prac-
tice.63
FTC involvement in a matter usually begins with the filing of a
complaint, either by the public or the FTC, which alleges unfair or
deceptive business practices. Broad investigative powers then
rest with the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection, where infor-
mation is received and evaluated to determine whether further
action is warranted. 64 If a decision is made to proceed against the
violating party, the FTC may give notice of its intent to initiate
57. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 155-57.
58. E. GELLTHORN, .upra note 50, at 125.
59. 5 U.S.C. § 551-559 (1976).
60. B. SCHWARTZ, rupra note 53, at 165.
61. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 211 (7th ed.
1979).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1976).
63. F. MILLER & B. CLARK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION 11
(1980). The three required elements for FrC jurisdiction are found within section
5 of the FTC Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). Prior to the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, 15
U.S.C. § 45, 52-55 (1976), the FTC was considered to have jurisdiction only when
acts sought to be regulated were harmful to competition.
64. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL AND BUSINESS PROBLEMS OF THE ADVER-
TISING INDUSTRY 231 (1980).
formal complaint proceedings. The violator or respondent is then
given ten days in which to notify the FTC of its interest in settling
the matter by consent order.65
Consent orders are formal, published, agreements entered into
by the FTC and those against whom it proceeds. The orders,
which become final in seventy-five percent of all cases, 6 6 are bind-
ing in the same manner as if entered after adjudication. No ad-
mission of violation is required and terms of the orders are
usually negotiable. 67 If a consent order is not reached, the FTC
continues with its complaint and begins adjudicative proceedings
before an FTC administrative law judge, in which a cease and de-
sist order68 is sought. At the proceeding's conclusion, the judge
may issue the cease and desist order, which then becomes the de-
cision of the FTC in thirty days unless the FTC orders a stay or
the violator initiates an appeal. Once the cease and desist order
is final, the violator has sixty days to submit a compliance report
"setting forth in detail the manner and form of its compliance
with the order."69 Any appeal from an order goes directly to a
federal court of appeals. Cease and desist orders, which are also
published, are prospective in nature, blocking only future conduct
that is offensive and usually doing nothing to remedy past
wrongs.7o However, in recent years, cease and desist orders have
been used to compel "corrective" or affirmative disclosures 7 1 in
future advertising, as was done in the famous Warner-Lambert
Co. v. FTC72 Listerine case of 1975.
Violation of a consent or cease and desist order under the 1975
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improve-
65. E. ROCKEFELLER, DESK BOOK OF FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 53-55
(1972). The FTC also can obtain preconsent order promises of compliance and
then stop the matter even prior to obtaining a consent order. F. MILLER & B.
CLARK, supra note 63, at 12.
66. Note, The Magnuson-Moss Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission
Act: Improvements or Broken Promises?, 61 IOWA L. REV. 222, 225 (1975).
67. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 234.
68. The cease and desist order was the primary enforcement tool given to the
FTC in the FTC Act.
69. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 233-25.
70. F. MILLER & B. CLARK, supra note 63, at 13.
71. With corrective advertising orders, future advertising is permitted only if
corrective advertising is performed to "dispel" misconceptions created by earlier
deceptive advertising.
72. 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975), modified, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 950 (1978). See Note, Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC: Corrective Advertising
Gives Listerine a Taste of Its Own Medicine, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 957 (1978). In
Warner-Lambert, the FTC found Listerine advertisements to be grossly deceptive
because they made completely erroneous claims regarding the product. As a con-
dition to future advertising, the FTC required Warner-Lambert to publish adver-
tisements which would correct the public misconceptions.
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ments Act (Magnuson-Moss Act)73 can result in a civil action by
the FTC before a federal district court, with fines up to $10,000.74
Such orders are binding even if the party violating the order was
not a party to the proceeding during which the order was issued.
The FTC need only prove that the acts complained of were found
to be unfair or deceptive in the earlier proceeding. 75 This signifi-
cant new power of the FTC has the effect of transforming any con-
sent or cease and desist order into an industry-wide regulation
having the force of law. 76
Advisory opinions77 and industry guides7 8 are other methods
used by the FTC to control improper business practices. Industry
guides, such as the endorsement Guides, are "administrative in-
terpretations of the laws administered by the Commission." 79
The concept behind issuing industry guides is that businesses
will accordingly adjust their business practices, thereby avoiding
difficulties with the FTC, legal fees, and time costs. The initiative
for releasing industry guides may come from within the FTC or at
the request of other interested parties. Though not required to do
so, the FTC usually solicits public comment prior to adopting
guides in final form, as was done with the endorsement Guides.80
Industry guides do not have the force of law8l but failure to com-
ply with their provisions may result in an action by the FTC.
However, such proceedings are based upon violations of the stat-
utes which underlie the guides rather than for violations of the
guides themselves. 82
In addition, the FTC is now clearly empowered under the
73. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1976).
74. Id.
75. D. EPSTEIN, CONSUMER PROTECTION 17-21 (1976). Prior to the Magnuson-
Moss Act, the FTC could do nothing more to a first-time violator than impose a
consent or cease and desist order. This had the effect of giving "one free bite at
the apple" to anyone violating FTC rules.
76. See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
77. Advisory opinions of the FrC are not relevant to this article and are there-
for not discussed. For an excellent explanation of advisory opinions, see G. ROBIN-
SON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 545-46 (1974).
78. The FrC endorsement Guides discussed in this article are industry guides.
79. E. ROCKEFELLER, supra note 65, at 50.
80. See note 132 infra and accompanying text. The APA requires that public
comments be solicited only when agencies are creating substantive rules, as op-
posed to those that are procedural or interpretive.
81. See notes 52-55 supra and accompany text.
82. F. MILLER & B. CLARK, supra note 63, at 39.
Magnuson-Moss Act 83 to issue substantive rules, 84 though such
was not always the case. The FTC rules, called trade regulation
rules, are directed at specific products or prohibit specific acts.
An action brought for violation of a trade regulation rule requires
only that the FTC prove violation of the rule itself, as opposed to
an action based upon an industry guide, which requires a showing
of violation of the underlying statute. 85 Trade regulation rules are
thus considered to have the force of law86 and, under the
Magnuson-Moss Act, first-time violations can now be punished
with civil penalties.8 7
The Magnuson-Moss Act also gives the FTC the option of seek-
ing civil redress for damages on behalf of anyone harmed by un-
fair or deceptive business practices. 88 This powerful new tool
offers significant potential not only for aiding victims of unfair
acts but also in controlling those who commit those acts.
The significant role of the FTC in advertising nationally indi-
cates that a discussion of its impact upon state law is warranted.
3. FTC Preemption of State Advertising Law
The expansion of the FTC's authority primarily due to the
Magnuson-Moss Act has caused it to be the most powerful regula-
tory body in the advertising field. However, both Senate and
House reports concerning the Magnuson-Moss Act clearly indi-
cate that preemption of state consumer protection laws was not
83. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1976).
84. See notes 56-61 supra and accompany text.
85. The paragraph below demonstrates the distinction between FTC trade reg-
ulation rules and industry guides:
Assume that the Commission issues a trade regulation requir-
ing that all aspirin advertisement include the statement "ALL
ASPIRIN IS ALIKE." If the FTC decided to prosecute a viola-
tion of the rule, the complaint would charge a failure to in-
clude the required legend rather than allege a "deceptive
practice." All the Commission would have to show was the
absence of the required language; it would not have to prove
the conclusion that underlies this hypothetical rule that the
omission of the required language is a deceptive act. If on the
other hand, the Commission merely issues an industry guide
on aspirin advertising, an action by the FTC would have to be
based on violation of the statute, not violation of the guide.
The Commission would have to prove the Commission of a
deceptive act or practice rather than merely a violation of the
industry guide.
D. EPSTEIN, supra note 75, at 15-16.
86. See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
87. D. EPSTEIN, supra note 75, at 20. The Magnuson-Moss Act allows civil suits
for first-time violations of trade regulation rules and consent or cease and desist
orders. See notes 73-76 supra and accompanying text.
88. See PRACTISING LAw INSTrrUTE, supra note 64, at 236-37.
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intended.89 Although preemption of state law is not the FTC's
purpose, the FTC can support state regulations which are found
to be deficient. Thus, the likelihood of FTC preemption of state
consumer protection laws, including those dealing with advertis-
ing, still exists. 90 Still, for the FrC to maximize its potential, it
must establish close working relationships with state and local
agencies.
State laws include prohibitions against many varieties of false
or deceptive advertising practices. Some states have even out-
lawed misrepresentations concerning certain types of deceptive
endorsements, such as misstatements of sponsorship, association,
or approval. 91 Most state advertising laws, however, speak in gen-
eral terms prohibiting only broad categories of deceptive advertis-
ing practices. 92 State consumer protection laws generally appear
to be reflex reactions to particular abuses which are discovered.93
The foregoing discussion of early FTC advertising regulation,
general administrative law, FTC procedures and remedies, and
FTC preemption of state law has established the basis for a dis-
cussion of FrC control of advertising endorsements.
C. Growth of FTC Deceptive Endorsement Regulation
Even prior to the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Act,94 which firm-
ly fixed the FTC's power over deceptive business practices that
harm consumers, 95 the FTC sought to regulate misleading en-
dorsement advertising to the extend of its ability. In 1937, the
Supreme Court heard FTC v. Standard Education Society,96 a
89. Badal, Restrictive State Laws and the Federal Trade Commission, 29 AD. L.
REV. 239, 263 (1977).
90. See Note, supra note 66, at 231.
91. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SURVEY OF CON-
SUMER LAW FRAUD 36 (1978). See also Badal, supra note 89.
92. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508(a) (West Supp. 1980) which states that
"[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ... to make false advertising claims that (1)
purport to be based on factual, objective, or clinical evidence, or that (2) compare
the product's effectiveness or safety to that of other brand or products."
93. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra
note 91, at 207.
94. Ch. 311, § 4, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52-55
(1976)).
95. See notes 42-48 supra'and accompanying text. Prior to the Wheeler-Lea
Act, many courts held that F'C jurisdiction was limited to those cases where com-
petition was harmed by unfair methods of competition.
96. 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
case in which the FTC had issued a cease and desist order against
a company for selling encyclopedias and looseleaf services
through deceptive means including fictitious endorsements. The
FTC found that some endorsements had been given concerning
the books but that they were exaggerated and garbled while
others had been issued for a "previous work" which was substan-
tially different. The FTC order against the company was reversed
by the court of appeals, which held that buyers had not been ob-
tained through illegal misrepresentations. The court's holding
was based upon a lack of evidence to support any finding of mis-
representation of endorsements. 97 The United States Supreme
Court, however, reversed the court of appeals, and held that am-
ple evidence existed to support the FTC's order. The book dis-
tributors were prohibited from making any misrepresentations as
to endorsements. The Supreme Court did not include as part of
its analysis any discussion of harm to competition, as had once
been required in FTC v. Raladam Co. 98 Rather, emphasis was
upon the deceptive nature of the endorsements. The Court was
concerned that by allowing the use of untrue endorsements, the
books would continue to be sold by means which would harm the
public.9 9
Standard Education came before the Court some six years
after Raladam Co. and only one year prior before the passage of
the Wheeler-Lea Act. Thus, at the time of this decision, the Court
was increasing the jurisdiction of the FTC. The Court's attitude
had changed considerably since Raladam, as was illustrated by
FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros. 100 and subsequent decisions. The
Court appeared much more willing to allow the FTC to assume a
more aggressive role.
One of the earliest and most significant FTC cases to involve
endorsement advertising was that of Northam Warran Corpora-
tion v. FTC.101 There, the FTC claimed that the use of paid en-
dorsers without disclosure of payment was contrary to public
policy. No assertion was made that the advertiser, Northam War-
ren Corporation, had falsified any endorsements of its Cutex
products. In fact, the FTC expressly found that the endorsements
were truthful expressions of opinion.1 02 The FTC, however, said
97. Id. at 116.
98. 283 U.S. 643 (1931). See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
99. 302 U.S. at 115-16.
100. 291 U.S. 304 (1934). See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
101. 59 F.2d 196 (2nd Cir. 1932).
102. Id. at 197. The Court said that "It] he quality of the petitioner's products is
not brought into question; nor is there a charge that its products were inade-
quately labeled or so testified to, by testimonials, as to induce the public to
purchase from it under practices of deception." Id.
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that the failure of Northam to disclose money payments to the en-
dorsers had "the capacity and tendency to mislead and deceive
the ultimate purchasers of said preparations into the erroneous
belief that said testimonials [were] entirely voluntary and un-
bought" and tended to divert trade from competitors who did not
use purchased testimonials in advertising their products. 103
When the case came before the court of appeals, the issue was
whether the FTC had jurisdiction 104 to prohibit the use of truthful
endorsements which it claimed were unfair competition solely be-
cause the endorsements were not accompanied by statements
that payments had been made to the endorsers. The court of ap-
peals reversed the FTC order in favor of Northam, holding that
because the endorsements represented honest beliefs of the en-
dorsers, there were no misrepresentations concerning the product
or harm to competition. Because there were no misrepresenta-
tions, the FrC was found to be without jurisdiction.105 The
Northam decision came only one year after the Supreme Court
decided FTC v. Raladam Co., which marked the low point in the
FTC's authority.' 06 Northam cited Raladam concerning the re-
quirement of finding harm to competition before the FTC could
invoke jurisdiction. It is important to note that the court of ap-
peals opinion also contained other novel elements peculiar to en-
dorsement advertising. Particularly, the court stated that
deception of the public was central to the issue of whether en-
dorsements could be regulated and that no presumption was
made that the public could be induced to purchase the products
so as to divert trade from competitors.l0 7
The court of appeals in Northam was willing to assume that the
public was not easily deceived by the use of endorsements and
that most people would assume that payments were being made
to endorsers. This endorsement theory has remained largely in-
tact since Northam and has even been adopted in a modified form
in the FTC's new endorsement Guides.108 Thus, even today, en-
dorsement advertisements are not presumptively condemned
103. Id.
104. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
105. 59 F.2d at 198.
106. See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
107. 59 F.2d at 197. It must be remembered that Northam incorporated the "de-
ception" standard some six years before it was adopted by the Wheeler-Lea Act 15
U.S.C. § 45, 52-55 (1976).
108. 1980 Guides, supra note 9, at § 255.5.
simply because there is nondisclosure regarding payment to en-
dorsers. This conclusion is supported by an FTC Advisory Opin-
ion' 09 which was issued in 1967, advising a school that its practice
of paying students to advertise the school was not contrary to
FTC policy." 0
The FTC has aggressively sought to regulate other types of ad-
vertising endorsement problems. In re National Dynamics
Corp."' held that endorsement can be used only so long as the
advertiser has good reason to believe that the endorser's views to-
ward the product have not changed. In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
v. FTC,112 the use of fraudulent endorsements was prohibited.
Alteration of independent testing laboratory reports for advertis-
ing purposes was condemned in Country Tweeds v. FTC. 113 Fi.
nally, the distortion of an FTC consent order in advertising, made
to look instead like an FTC endorsement, was held to be fraudu-
lent in Mytinger & Casselberry 114
D. Endorser Liability for False Endorsements
Not only has the FTC sought to stop advertisers from using de-
ceptive endorsements, but in recent years it has found endorsers
potentially liable for their roles in advertisements. Perhaps the
most famous case is that of In re Cooga Mooga,ll5 which involved
singer Pat Boone. Karr Preventative Medical Products used en-
dorsements from Boone and his daughters to advertise its Acne-
Statin product, a mail-order treatment for acne. In return for his
efforts, Boone received a share of the product's sales. Advertise-
ments involving Boone strongly implied that Acne-Statin's supe-
rior abilities had cured his daughters of acne.116 The FTC sought
to stop Boone from advertising Acne-Statin because if found that
his daughters had not used the product and that it was not effec-
tive as an acne treatment. The FTC complained that Boone's
109. 72 F.T.C. 1052 (1967).
110. One commissioner dissented, stating that the practice was deceptive. Id.
111. 82 F.T.C. 488 (1973).
112. 192 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1951). Another excellent example is FTC v. A.P.W.
Paper Co. There the defendant was ordered to stop using the name and symbol of
the American Red Cross on its products because such use had never been author-
ized.
113. 326 F.2d 144 (2nd Cir. 1964).
114. 57 F.T.C. 717 (1960). Many other examples of deceptive FTC endorsement
cases could be cited, but those discussed here suffice to demonstrate the wide
range of such actions.
115. 92 F.T.C. 310 (1978).
116. Id. at 316. One advertisement read: "With four daughters, we've tried the
leading acne medication at our house, and nothing ever seemed to work until our
girls met a Beverly Hills doctor and got some real help through a product she de-
veloped called 'Acne-Statin.'" Id. at 315.
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false advertisements had the capacity to mislead the public and
harm competition. Boone was ordered to refrain from represent-
ing either that his daughters had been cured by Acne-Statin or
that it would cure acne.
The most important aspect of the case was an order for Boone
to contribute his pro rata share of twenty-five cents per bottle of
Acne-Statin toward any claims for restitution. Boone's total liabil-
ity was limited to the amount he received as payment for his en-
dorsements. Any restitution was also limited to sales made
during the Boone advertising campaign." 7 By assuming personal
liability in the consent order, Boone established a precedent, not
legally binding, which indicates that potential product endorsers
should verify product claims before agreeing to endorsements.1ii8
Albert A. Kramer, Director of Consumer Protection for the FTC,
stated with regard to the Boone case that "the effectiveness of
having a product touted by a well-known movie star or sports
figure is apparent from the increasingly use of celebrity endorse-
ments in advertising. A sales pitch by a celebrity may be more
believable than the same message delivered by an unknown
spokesperson."" 9
Another very significant case was that of In re Leroy Gordon
Cooper. 20 There, former astronaut Gordon Cooper endorsed an
automobile product for American Consumer, Inc., which was
falsely purported to increase fuel economy of automobiles. In re-
turn for his marketing role, Cooper received a percentage of sales.
In the advertisements, Cooper was represented as being an ex-
pert in the field of automotive engineering and as having no con-
nection with American Consumer. 12 1 The FTC, however, found
117. Id. at 321-22.
118. See In Re Cooga Mooga and Charles E. Boone, supra note 3, at 533-35.
119. FTC News Summary, May 19, 1978, at 1-2.
120. 94 F.T.C. 674 (1979). See American Consumer, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 645 (1979); Ad-
marketing, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 664 (1979). These were actions against the manufacturer
and advertising agency in the Cooper case. Orders in the three cases were very
similar.
121. 94 F.T.C. at 680. One advertisement read, in part, that "[ijf there's one
thing an astronaut has no use for, it's a new invention that doesn't do what it's
supposed to do. That's why we asked astronaut Gordon Cooper to test the G-R
GAS SAVER VALVE in his independent testing laboratory." Id. Another read as
follows:
Hi, I'm Gordon Cooper. As you may know, I was selected to be one of
the first astronauts to explore space due to my extensive engineering
background. At the present time I m actively heading my own engineering
company, where we are engaged in the designing and testing of products
the advertisements to be grossly deceptive and ordered Cooper to
stop misrepresenting that he possessed automotive expertise.
Cooper was ordered to use endorsements only within twelve
months of the date that express written and dated authorization
to use the endorsements was granted. Additionally, the FTC or-
dered Cooper to disclose any material connection which might ex-
ist between advertisers and endorsers with which he was
involved. However, "material connection," was explicitly stated
not to include the payment to an endorser of a fixed sum, re-
ceived prior to dissemination of the endorsement.12 2 The FTC's
for industry. The G.R. VALVE I am holding has been tested and retested
by leading independent laboratories along with my own tests. And it's a
fact ... this G.R. Valve will increase your auto mileage up to twenty eight
percent ... improve your car's performance, clean you engine ... and re-
duce smog emissions.
Id. at 688.
122. Id. at 696. Cooper's advertisements indicated that he ran an independent
testing facility, which agreed to examine American Consumer's product. The FrC,
however, found that Cooper was a principal in the marketing of the product, which
established a "material" connection. Id. at 676. The FTC also ordered Cooper to
cease:
d. representing.., any performance characteristic of [any] product or
service unless (1) at the time of making the representation ... [he] pos-
sessed and relied upon competent and reliable scientific tests substantiat-
ing the representation, and (2) . . . [he] possesses a written test report
which describes both test procedures and test results. A competent and
reliable "scientific test" is one in which one or more persons, qualified by
professional training, education and experience, formulate and conduct a
test and evaluate its results in an objective manner using testing proce-
dures which are generally accepted in the profession to attain valid and
reliable results. The test may be conducted or approved by (a) a reputa-
ble and reliable organization which conducts such tests as one of its prin-
cipal functions, (b) an agency or department of the government of the
United States, or (c) persons employed or retained by respondent if they
are qualified (as defined above in this paragraph) and conduct and evalu-
ate the test in an objective manner.
e. misrepresenting in any manner the purpose, content, or conclusion of
any test or survey pertaining to such product or service;
f. misrepresenting in any manner either consumer preference for such
product or service or the results obtained by consumer usage of such
product or service;
g. misrepresenting in any manner the performances, efficacy, capacity, or
usefulness of such product or service.
Id., at 696-97.
Cooper also was ordered to stop endorsing products outside his area of exper-
tise unless he had "made a reasonable inquiry into the truthfulness of his en-
dorsement, and possesse[d] and relie[d] upon information resulting from such
inquiry. . . ." Id. at 697. "Reasonable inquiry" was defined as:
(1) obtaining information from at least two competent and reliable
sources independent of the advertiser and any other party with an eco-
nomic interest in the sale of the product or service which is the subject of
the endorsement; or
(2) obtaining information from the advertiser or from other parties with
an economic interest in the product or service which is the subject of the
endorsement and having such information independently evaluated by at
least two competent and reliable sources.
Id.
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requirement of disclosure of material connection was included as
an attempt to further reduce possibilities for deception of the
public. The underlying rationale was that if the public was aware
of material connections, it would be more skeptical of any product
claims made.
The position adopted in In re Leroy Gordon Cooper seems diffi-
cult to reconcile with the doctrine of Northam Warren Corpora-
tion v. FTC123 which states that payments to an endorser need
not be disclosed. It appears, though, that the FTC in Cooper may
have been attempting to strike a middle ground. By requiring dis-
closure of material connections between advertisers and endors-
ers, the FTC was ensuring that any potential deception of the
public would be minimized. Apparently, the FTC assumed that
continued financial links between advertisers and endorsers could
increase the likelihood of false advertisements.124 At the same
time, by not requiring disclosure of payments made prior to dis-
bursement of endorsements, the FTC may have recognized that
payments to endorsers, at least when not of a continuing nature,
are not conclusively against public policy. This may have been
based upon the assumption that the public knows that most en-
dorsers, especially celebrities, are being paid.
The Northam doctrine thus appears to have continuing validity
in at least certain circumstances. As noted in Cooper, compensa-
tion paid to an endorser prior to dissemination of an advertise-
ment is not considered to be material. Therefore, endorsers do
not have to disclose payments received in every case.1 25
Having examined the role of the FrC in advertising and its
evolving impact upon endorsement advertising, the stage is set to
examine the new FTC endorsement Guides.126
123. 59 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1932).
124. A good analogy is that of an informant witness in a trial. While it is com-
monly understood that experts are paid flat sums of money for testifying in court,
it is also commonly understood that a contingency fee arrangement for an inform-
ant is less preferable. This is because a contingency fee arrangement will give the
informant a vested interest in the outcome of the trial. Most lawyers consider it
better to "avoid even the appearance of impropriety" and therefore do not enter
into contingency fee arrangements with informant witnesses.
125. The rule in the Cooper case, however, has been limited by the FTC en-
dorsement Guides, which require disclosure of any payments made only to con-
sumer endorsers, whether made only prior to dissemination of the advertisement
or not. See notes 160-62 infra and accompanying text.
126. 1980 Guides, supra note 9; 1975 Guides, infra note 14; 1972 Guides, supra
note 8.
IV. NEW FTC ENDORSEMENT GUIDES
On January 18, 1980, the FTC released final versions of its
Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Ad-
vertising (Guides).127 The Guides, which touch upon almost
every aspect of endorsements advertising, do not have the force of
law 128 nor have they been explicitly exercised to date. However,
the Guides clearly indicate that violations may subject both en-
dorsers and advertisers to FTC proceedings. 129 This is especially
true in light of the recent cases of In re Cooga Mooga 130 and In re
Leroy Gordon Cooper'3 ' which were both brought against endors-
ers.
When proposed versions of the Guides were first issued by the
FTC in 1972, they were accompanied by notice to the public of an
opportunity to submit suggestions or objections. 32 After much
discussion, the FTC released other Guides in 1975, but it was not
until 1980 that the Guides were issued in final form. During this
period, the Guides attracted media attention, primarily because of
the impact which they were predicted to have upon celebrities.133
The Guides have also generated much discussion among those
in the advertising industry. Several organizations in the field, in-
cluding two of the most powerful, National Association of Broad-
casters (NAB) and American Association of Advertising Agencies
(AAAA), have made efforts to keep their members appraised of
the Guides and their impact. 3 4 Such organizations were respon-
sible for much of the public comment made to the FTC on the
new Guides. Because of substantial changes made in some
Guides between the proposed and final versions, it is clear that
the FTC took cognizance of comments it received. In fact, the
AAAA considers itself as being primarily responsible for certain
changes.135
The following discussion will analyze the new 1980 Guides, and
contrast them with the proposed 1972 and 1975 versions. Also,
127. 1980 Guides, supra note 9.
128. See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
129. 1975 Guides, supra note 14.
130. 92 F.T.C. 310 (1978). See also notes 115-19 supra and accompanying text.
131. 94 F.T.C. 674 (1979). See also notes 120-25 supra and accompanying text.
132. The solicitation of public comments was done at the option of the FTC,
since the APA requires such solicitations only when agencies are creating sub-
stantive rules.
133. See, e.g., FTC: Celebrities Must Use Products They Pitch, 66 A.B.A.J. 274
(1980).
134. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS Code Authority, Code
News, (June, 1975); AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF ADVERTISING AGENCIES, BULLETIN
No. 3280 (1975).
135. Id.
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criticisms of the Guides will point out their deficiences and un-
resolved issues.
A. General Considerations Guide
The Guide entitled "General Considerations"136 was first pro-
posed in 1975 to state "certain basic principles that are applicable
to all endorsements." Subsection (a), finalized in 1980, states that
"je]ndorsements must reflect the honest opinions, findings be-
liefs, or experiences of the endorser. Furthermore, they must not
contain any representations which would be deceptive, or could
not be substantiated if made directly by the advertiser." 3 7 This
incorporates the long standing rule against statements in en-
dorsements that cannot be supported if presented in the adver-
tiser's words rather than the endorser's. 3 8 The rule is well-
illustrated by United States v. John J. Fulton,139 in which a drug
company was found to have deceptively advertised worthless
drugs as being effective under the guise that it had received let-
ters from doctors verifying the curative values of the drugs. The
court held that the company could not escape responsibility for
the advertisements by claiming that others, the endorsing doc-
tors, had made the deceptive statements.
Subsection (b) in this proposed 1975 Guides' 40 required that
endorsements not be distorted or presented out of context. This
embodies the holding of In re Country Tweeds, 14 1 which prohib-
ited alterations in advertisements of product testing results which
136. 1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.1.
137. Id.
138. The NAB Code Authority's Radio and Television Codes have very similar
provisions. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, THE RADIO CODE 16
(1980). "Advertising testimonials should be genuine, and reflect an honest ap-
praisal of personal experience." Id. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCAST-
ERS, THE TELEVISION CODE 15 (1980). "Personal endorsements ... shall be
genuine and reflect personal experience. They shall contain no statement that
cannot be supported if presented in the advertiser's own words." Id. It is possi-
ble, because of the similarity in wording between 1975 Guide and the Code provi-
sions as quoted above, that the 1980 Code references to endorsements were
patterned after the 1975 Guide. The implications of the advertising industry's self-
regulations are important to consider in any analysis of government regulation of
advertising.
139. 33 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1929).
140. 1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.1(b).
141. 326 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1964).
made the advertised product look much more desirable. 42 While
this rule does not preclude the editing of an endorser's exact
words, it does prohibit changes which do not accurately present
the endorser's statements.143 No assistance is provided in inter-
preting the extent to which changes can be made, but it is as-
sumed that exaggeration of the endorser's opinion in favor of a
product would be improper.
The concluding sentence of subsection (b) introduced the sig-
nificant requirement that an advertiser may use an endorsement
only so long as there exists good reason to believe that the en-
dorser continues to subscribe to the views presented in the en-
dorsement. 4 4 This places a duty upon advertisers to periodically
check with their endorsers to see that their views have not
changed. An example of just such a duty is found in the 1973 case
of In re National Dynamics Corp. ,145 in which a seller of a battery
additive was ordered to cease from publishing any endorsements
unless (1) written authorization had been obtained and (2) the
advertiser also had good reason to believe that the endorsers'
views had not changed.146
The requirement to verify endorsers' views would have applica-
tion only in those situations where an advertisement is used for
an extended period of time, such that the endorser has an oppor-
tunity, with the lapse of time, to adopt other viewpoints regarding
the advertised product. 47 The major issue concerning this contin-
uing duty is the frequency with which checks should be made,
but it can be assumed that verification every six of twelve months
would be sufficient as a reasonable time. It is also most interest-
ing to note that no corresponding duty is found in subsection (b)
which requires endorsers to notify advertisers if they change
their views toward the advertised products. This is especially im-
portant in light of the new findings of endorser liability in the
cases of In re Cooga Mooga 148 and In re Leroy Gordon Cooper.149
At first glance it may seem to be grossly inconsistent to require
advertisers to verify endorsers' beliefs about endorsed products
and yet not require endorsers to notify advertisers of changed be-
liefs. However, the FTC may have been assuming that most en-
142. Tests performed by testing companies which are then referred to in adver-
tisements are considered to be endorsements.
143. 1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.1(b).
144. Id.
145. 82 F.T.C. 488 (1973).
146. Id. at 569.
147. There is the increased likelihood, with the passage of time, that an en-
dorser can change his or her views with regard to the endorsed products.
148. 92 F.T.C. 310 (1978).
149. 94 F.T.C. 674 (1979).
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dorsers are paid a flat sum of money at the time of endorsement
and thereafter have no continuing ties with the advertised prod-
uct. If this assumption is correct, then endorsers would have little
motivation to contact advertisers regardless of what might occur
since they would consider themselves as having no further obliga-
tions to the advertisers.
In 1980, subsection (b)150 was altered to require verification of
an endorser's beliefs about endorsed products only if the en-
dorser is either a celebrity or an expert. Thus, consumer endors-
ers have been exempted. Although no explanation was given, the
FTC probably exempted advertisers from periodically verifying
consumer endorsers' views for two reasons. First, it is generally
understood that because consumer endorsers by definition are
not recognized by the public, their opinions will be valued more
lightly than those of celebrities and experts. Second, it can be as-
sumed that the FTC recognized problems inherent in requiring
advertisers to periodically verify the beliefs of the many con-
sumer endorsers. It can be argued that it is easier to contact ce-
lebrities and experts than obscure consumers.151
Subsection (c)15 2 of this Guide provides that where an adver-
tisement represents that an endorser uses the endorsed product,
then the endorser must have been a bona fide user of it at the
time of the endorsement. In addition, the advertiser may con-
tinue to run an advertisement only so long as he has good reason
to believe that the endorser remains a bona fide user of the prod-
uct. In re Cooga Mooga153 provides an excellent example of an
endorser being presented as a bona fide user of a product. There,
Pat Boone indicated in advertisements that his daughters were
users of Acne-Statin, an acne treatment, though they actually
were not. The FTC found the advertisements to be misleading
and therefore ordered not only the advertising company, but also
Boone, to stop falsely representing that his daughters were Acne-
Statin users. Liability was thus imposed upon both the advertiser
and Boone for their deceptive advertisements.
The requirement of bona fide use presents several difficult
150. 1980 Guides, supra note 9, § 255.1(b).
151. For example, it is likely that experts and celebrities would sign contracts
with advertisers whereas consumer endorsers might not. Thus, an advertiser
might not even know how to contact a particular consumer endorser.
152. 1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.1(c).
153. 92 F.T.C. 310 (1978).
questions. For example, in its 1975 Letter of Comment to the
FTC,154 the AAAA suggested that examples be given along with
subsection (c) "to clarify the requirement of 'bona fide use' by
distinguishing those occasions where the person who utters the
advertising message acts as a 'spokesman' 5 5 or 'expert' [en-
dorser]."156 Apparently following this suggestion, the FTC added
a new example to the subsection in 1980157 which presents an ex-
pert, who after a blind test, states the benefits of a particular
product being advertised. A comment at the conclusion of the ex-
ample states that the expert probably is not presented as a user
of the product because she was involved only in a test. Thus, the
bona fide user requirement would not apply. However, the exam-
ple would have presented a much more difficult question if no
blind test had been performed since the example would then
have simply presented an expert describing why one product was
superior to others. Another similar problem arises when, for ex-
ample, a well-known professional golfer endorses a line of inex-
pensive golf clubs which bear his or her name. Ifthe golfer were
pictured in an advertisement as using the clubs, then it could be
argued that the bona fide use requirement of subsection (c)
154. 1975 AAAA COMMENTS, supra note 1, at 4.
155. See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
156. The AAAA suggested two new examples to the FTC:
Example 2: A TV commercial for an automobile shows a
well-known personality, not identified with the automobile in-
dustry, who states that the automobile has disc brakes and
torsion bar suspension and that its gasoline consumption was
rated at 34 miles per gallon by the Environmental Protection
Agency. This person need not be a bona fide user of the auto-
mobile since he is a spokesman, not an endorser.
Example 3: The facts are the same except that the person-
ality making the statements is widely known as an expert in
the design or operation of automobiles. Because of his known
expertise, this person is an expert endorser. While his en-
dorsement should comply with § 255.3 (expert endorsements),
he need not be a bona fide use of the automobile as defined in
proposed § 255.1 unless the advertisement represents that he
uses the product.
AAAA COMMENTS, supra note 1, at 4.
157. 1980 Guides, supra note 9, § 255.1. Example 2 reads as follows:
Example 2: A television advertisement portrays a woman
seated at a desk on which rest five unmarked electric type-
writers. An announcer says "We asked Mrs. X, an executive
secretary for over ten years, to try these five unmarked type-
writers and tell us which one she liked best."
The advertisements portrays the secretary typing one each
machine, and then picking the advertiser's brand. The an-
nouncer asks her why, and Mrs. X gives her reasons. Assum-
ing that consumers would perceive this presentation as a
"blind" test, this endorsement would probably not represent
that Mrs. X actually uses the adversiser's machines in her
work.
Id.
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would apply. However, this could lead to the absurd result of the
professional golfer being found to have violated the bona fide use
requirement when it would be impractical to require him or her
to use any but the very best, custom-made clubs. Though the
bona fide use requirement sounds good in theory, it is questiona-
ble in practice because of its ambiguities.
B. Disclosure Of Material Connections Guide
In 1972, the "Disclosure of Material Facts" Guide stated that
"[wihen there exists a connection between an endorser and a
seller of a product being advertised, and when that connection is
a material fact in the context of the advertisement, then the con-
nection should be fully disclosed."'15 8 Another version of the
Guide, proposed by the FTC in 1975,159 was altered to require dis-
closure of connections which might "materially affect the weight
or credibility" of endorsements. Thus, the FTC changed the
Guide from requiring that all "material facts" be disclosed from
requiring disclosure of connections which might affect the en-
dorsement's credibility.
"Connection" was stated in the 1975 Guide to ordinarily not "in-
clude the payment or promise of payment to an individual en-
dorser so long as the advertiser did not represent that the
endorsement was given without compensation."'60 However, this
exemption from disclosure of compensation is valid only if the en-
dorser is a celebrity or an expert. In other words, all payments to
consumer endorsers must be disclosed, regardless of when made.
158. 1972 Guides, supra note 8, § 255.3.
159. 1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.5.
160. Id. This definition was retained in the 1980 Guide, which reads as follows:
When there exists a connection between the endorser and the seller of
the advertised product which might materiality [sic] affect the weight or
credibility of the endorsement (i.e,, the connection is not reasonably ex-
pected by the audience) such connections must be fully disclosed. An ex-
ample of a connection that is ordinarily expected by viewers and need not
be disclosed is the payment or promise of payment to an endorser who is
an expert or well known personality, as long as the advertiser does not
represent that the endorsement was given without compensation. How-
ever, when the endorser is neither represented in the advertisement as an
expert nor is known to a significant portion of the viewing public, then the
advertiser should clearly and conspicuously disclose either the payment
or promise of compensation prior to and in exchange for the endorsement
or the fact that the endorser know or had reasons to know or to believe
that if the endorsement favors the advertised product some benefit, such
as an appearance on TV, would be extended to the endorser.
1980 Guide, supra note 9, § 255.5 (emphasis added).
Requiring disclosure of payment to any endorser is in conflict
with the holding of Northam Warren Corporation v. FTC.161
There, compensation to endorsers was explicitly considered not
to impute any taint or implication of deception to advertisements.
If this is the case, the wisdom of carving out a requirement that
only consumer endorsers disclose compensation is questionable.
Apparently, the FTC's rationale rests upon the assumption that
the public knows experts and celebrities are being paid for their
endorsements whereas consumer endorsers are portrayed as act-
ing voluntarily because of the virtues of the products they en-
dorse. The FTC considers any payments to consumer endorsers
to be material connections requiring disclosure. Taken literally,
all advertisements using paid consumer endorsers must now state
that payment has been made.162
The 1980 Guide pertaining to "Disclosure of Material Connec-
tions" is also more specific than before because it defines "con-
nection" in terms of something "not reasonably expected by the
audience."'163 One can only guess what is meant by "not reason-
able expected," but it can be assumed to include anything which
might materially affect a potential customer's decison either to
buy or not to buy the product being advertised. The FTC has sur-
prisingly determined in the 1980 Guide that when consumer en-
dorsers knew or should have known that they would be in
advertisements if they said the "right things," then such facts
should be disclosed. Example three to the Guide, which illus-
trates the rule, involves an actual restaurant patron who is inter-
viewed for a television commercial while seated at the restaurant
counter. The patron, who is presented as neither an expert nor a
celebrity, is asked for his spontaneous opinion of a new food
product being served in the restaurant. 164 Thus, the requirement
161. 59 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1932).
162. It is also of interest to note that consumer endorsers probably have much
less influence than celebrities and experts over the buying public since the public
might tend to view consumer endorsers as being much like themselves. If con-
sumer endorsers truly do have less influence over the public than other endorsers,
one is led to question the propriety of the FTC's rigid rule of always requiring dis-
closure of payments to consumer endorsers.
163. 1980 Guide, supra note 9, § 255.5.
164. Because the restaurant patron knew he might be in an advertisement, a
statement to that effect must accompany the endorsement.
Example 3: An actual patron of a restaurant, who is neither known to
the public nor presented as an expert, is shown seated at the counter. He
is asked for his "spontaneous" opinion of a new food product served in the
restaurant. Assume, first, that the advertiser had posted a sign on the
door of the restaurant informing all who entered that day that patrons
would be interviewed by the advertiser as past of its TV promotion of its
new soy protein "steak." This notification would materially affect the
weight or credibility of the patron's endorsement, and, therefore, viewers
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that all payments to consumer endorsers be disclosed now in-
cludes even intangible benefits such as the opportunity to be tele-
vised in an advertisement. 65
It is not clear how this new Guide will impact the advertising
industry. The 1980 version marks the first time that the FTC has
even required an unpaid consumer endorser to disclose any infor-
mation in advertisements. One might ask what there is to dis-
close, and how the disclosure should be done. Though it is clear
that the FrC is attempting to eliminate what it considers to be de-
ceptive endorsements, this very narrow and restrictive rule will
do little except arguably bring within its coverage all consumer
endorsements. It is therefore conceivable that all consumer en-
dorsements of every type will be required to disclose a form of
"compensation." If the FTC intends to enforce compliance with
this new disclosure requirement, the public may soon see unfa-
miliar notices in many advertisements.166
In its Letter of Comment 167 to the FrC, the American Associa-
tion of Advertising Agencies did not criticize the 1975 Guide itself,
but attacked one of its examples which required disclosure of an
advertiser's role in commissioning an independent test, which
was used in an advertisement. The AAAA objected to the re-
quirement of "disclosure of 'the advertiser's role in orginating and
financing' any study for which it had paid a substantial share of
the expenses and [which] would also require disclosure of adver-
tiser participation in the test design." This would be unfair, the
AAAA argued, to both advertisers and independent research or-
ganizations and would disserve consumers who would be led by a
of the advertisement should be clearly and conspicuously informed of the
circumstance under which the endorsement was obtained.
Assume, in the alternative, that the advertiser had not posted a sign on
the door of the restaurant, but had informed all interviewed customers of
the "hidden camera" only after interviews were completed and the cus-
tomers had no reason to know or believe that their response was being re-
corded for use in an advertisement. Even if patrons were also told that
they would be paid for allowing the use of their opinions in advertising,
these facts need not be disclosed.
Id.
165. The FTC's broad interpretation of what constitutes "payment" to a con-
sumer endorser seems to encompass virtually every situation where the consumer
endorser is aware beforehand that an advertisement is being made.
166. For example, it would be surprising to see an advertisement with the fol-
lowing disclosure: "The views stated by the consumer may have been biased be-
cause the consumer believed or had reason to believe that he could be in this
advertisement by saying favorable things about product x."
167. 1975 AAAA COMMENTS, supra note 1, at 13-14.
kind of "reverse" deception to suspect the validity of any research
findings. The Letter also stated that it is normal for independent
testing laboratories to be paid for doing research, just as it is nor-
mal for manufacturers and advertisers to actually assist in test
procedures. The AAAA urged that if testing results are accurate
and unbiased, no disclosure should be required, regardless of who
participates. 68
A new example proposed in the AAAA Letter, based upon the
same factual setting as the FTC's, stated that no disclosure of the
advertiser's involvement would be required "unless the company
has reason to believe that the research design or procedures are
biased or otherwise invalid."169 In the final Guide released in
1980, the FTC changed the example which the AAAA criticized so
that it now does not require any disclosure of payment by an ad-
vertiser to a research laboratory. 70 Thus, the AAAA suggestion
concerning testing by independent agencies was followed. Due to
this adoption, the Example in the 1980 Guide now takes the oppo-
site position it did in 1975. This change of position indicates both
the impact which public comments have had upon formulation of
the Guides and the questionable nature of some FTC endorse-
ment philosophies. 17 1
C. Expert Endorsement Guide
An "expert" endorser is defined by the Guides as "an individ-
ual, group or institution possessing, as a result of experience,
study or training, knowledge of a particular subject, which knowl-
168. The AAAA proposal looked more to whether deception had occurred than
to the application of a mechanical rule requiring disclosure of advertiser involve-
ment.
169. 1975 AAAA COMMENTS, supra note 1, at 14. The proposed example was as
follows:
Example 1: A drug company commissions research on its product by an
independent research organization. The company pays all or a substantial
share of the expenses of the research product and participates in the test
design. A subsequent advertisement by the company desribes the
research finding. Unless the company has reason to believe that the re-
search design or procedures are biased or otherwise invalid, the advertise-
ment need not disclose the payment to the research organization or the
advertiser's share in the test design.
Id.
170. The 1980 example is identical to the 1975 version except it does not contain
the last two sentences pertaining to the disclosure requirement. Rather, it now
concludes by stating that "the advertiser's payment of expenses to the research
organization need not be disclosed in this advertisement. Application of the stan-
dards set by [the Guides entitled 'Expert Endorsements' and 'Endorsement by
Organizations'] provides sufficient assurance that the advertiser's payment will
not affect the weight of credibility of the endorsement." 1980 Guides, supra note 9,
§ 255.5.
171. See notes 214-25 infra and accompanying text.
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edge is superior to that generally acquired by ordinary individu-
als."'1 72 The 1972 proposed Guide concerning experts 173 stated
that an endorsement by an expert had to be based on an actual
exercise of the expertise, which the endorser is represented to
possess. The Guide also required that any study upon which the
endorsement is based must conform to what consumers are led to
believe.
The final form for the Guide concerning experts, issued in
1975,174 additionally required that an expert endorsement must be
supported by an actual exercise of the endorser's expertise, with
the endorser being held to the standard of what any other person
with similar expertise would do. The establishment in the 1975
Guide of this standard by which to evaluate expert endorsers is
significant. Where the expert was required under the 1972 Guide
to conform only to what consumers were led to believe, the expert
now must measure up to the standard of the "average reasonable
expert." 7 5 The perception of consumers really becomes secon-
dary, since it is now possible for an expert endorser to be found
in violation of this Guide without actually deceiving anyone.
While the primary purpose for establishing the Guides initially
was to control deception of the public with respect to endorse-
ments, deception now does not really appear to be an issue in this
particular Guide. Rather, this Guide now looks to the care exer-
cised by an expert in endorsing products.1 76
Perhaps the best example of a case involving a supposed "ex-
pert" endorser is that of In re Leroy Gordon Cooper.177 Though
he actually was not, Cooper was portrayed in advertisements as
being an expert in the field of automotive engineering and as hav-
172. 1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.0(d).
173. 1972 Guides, supra note 8, § 255.2.
174. 1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.3.
175. No longer is the expert held only to what consumers are led to expect.
Rather, now the expert is judged by what other similar experts would do in similar
circumstances.
176. This requirement of "care" implies that there might be circumstances
where an expert could meet the test of evaluating a product in a manner compati-
ble with what other similar experts would do and yet give a product endorsement
that is deceptive. Although the FTC gave no reason for requiring that experts be
held to the standard of what other similar experts would do, it can be assumed
that the FTC was trying to establish objective criteria by which to evaluate expert
endorsements. This, however, presents the very real possibility that an expert can
violate the standard without actually deceiving anyone.
177. 94 F.T.C. 674 (1979).
ing conducted tests upon the product which he endorsed.178 The
FTC found not only that Cooper was not an expert, but also that
he had not performed any tests as he had represented. This case,
though, does not represent the potential power of this Guide.
Had Cooper in fact been an expert and performed tests, the FTC
would have been able, under the new Guide, to evaluate his opin-
ions and procedures as an expert with regard to the endorsed
product.179 This seems to be an unwarranted and restrictive in-
trusion into the advertising field, especially in light of the fact that
no FTC cases indicate that endorsements by true experts present
significant problems.
Another aspect of this Guide merits examination. According to
the 1975 Guide, if an advertisement implies that an expert made a
comparison between products, such a comparison must actually
have been included as part of the expert's evaluation. Where the
"net impression" created by an endorsement is that the adver-
tised product is superior to other products, the expert must have
in fact found such superiority.180 This raises the possibility that a
violation of the 1975 Guide can be based upon something possibly
not even intended by the advertiser or the expert endorser. The
caveat here is that the exaggeration or "puffing" of product's char-
acteristics, which has been tolerated in advertising for years, can
be dangerous if found to be within the same advertisement in
which an expert has endorsed a product.'81 Even though the ex-
aggeration may not have been done by the expert himself, it is
possible that an examination of the advertisement under the "net
impression" test will evidence that a violation has occurred be-
cause it is possible to construe an expert's product endorsement
as supporting all claims made within the advertisement. 82
178. See notes 120-25 supra and accompanying text.
179. See notes 174-75 supra and accompanying text.
180. The relevant language of the Guide is quoted below:
Where, and to the extend that, the advertisement implies that the en-
dorsement was based upon a comparison such comparison must have
been included in his evaluation, and as a result of such comparison, he
must have concluded that, with respect to those features on which he is
expert and which are relevant and available to an ordinary consumer, the
endorsed product is at least equal overall to the competitor's products.
Moreover, where the net impression created by the endorsement is that
the advertised product is superior to other products with respect to any
such feature or features, then the expert must in fact have found such su-
periority.
1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.2(b).
181. The exaggeration referred to here, which is often call "puffery" in the ad-
vertising industry, occurs frequently when products are cast in unduly favorable
light. Although puffery has often been carried too far by advertisers, it tradition-
ally has been tolerated by both competitors and the FTC. See D. ROHRER, MASS
MEDIA, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND ADVERTISING 269 (1979).
182. The "net impression" test might give rise to situations where experts give
[Vol. 8: 697, 1981] FTC Endorsement Regulation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
This Guide requires that expert endorsements meet two crite-
ria. First, an endorsement by an expert must be with regard to
characteristics of the product about which the expert possesses
expertise, and second, the endorsement must also be with respect
to those features "which are relevant and available to an ordinary
consumer."1 83 The terms "relevant and available" are not defined
in the Guide nor illustrated in the accompanying examples. It ap-
pears that the terms make reference to those characteristics
which would be considered in purchase decisions and also be ca-
pable of duplication by consumers. These standards, however,
are of limited aid. Taken in their literal sense, it is questionable
whether a professional race car driver could demonstrate that a
particular sports car handled well at high speeds on a race track,
since the handling characteristics of the car under those condi-
tions are neither "relevant nor available" to the average con-
sumer.
184
Both examples to this Guide point out other items worth not-
ing. One example states that if an expert claims to use a product,
that product must measure up to consumer expectations even
though the expert says nothing more than that he uses the prod-
uct. 185 This means that the expert endorser's statement that he
truthful endorsements, but due to other misleading factors within the same adver-
tisement the experts' statements, are found to be deceptive.
183. 1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.3(b).
184. One can argue strongly that an advertisement should not be restricted
only because it presents a product in a manner which is not "available" to con-
sumer. In fact, it might be an effective marketing approach in some cases. Using
the sports car example, the advertisement might increase sales by demonstrating
that because the car handles well on a race track, it will also be a good car for the
average driver.
185. Example 4: The president of a commercial "home cleaning service"
states in a television advertisement that the service uses a particular
brand of cleanser in its business. Since the cleaning service's professional
success depends largely upon the performance of the cleansers it uses,
consumers would expect the service to be expert with respect to judging
cleansing ability, and not be satisfied using an inferior cleanser in its busi-
ness when it knows of a better one available to it. Accordingly, the clean-
ing service's endorsement must at least conform to those consumer
expectations. The service must, of course, actually use the endorsed
cleanser. Additionally, on the basis of its expertise, it must have deter-
mined that the cleansing ability of the endorsed cleanser is at least equal
(or superior, if such is the net impression conveyed by the advertisement)
to that of competing products with which the service has had experience
and which remain reasonable available to it. Since in this example, the
cleaning service's president makes no mention that the endorsed cleanser
was "chosen," "selected," or otherwise evaluated in side-by-side compari-
sons against its competitors, it is sufficient if the service has relied solely
uses a product will be taken as meaning that the product is wor-
thy of his use. The other example indicates that if an organiza-
tion, which is considered to be an expert, selects a product for
official use, an advertisement so stating will be deceptive if the
product relates to the organization's expertise and the organiza-
tion has failed to perform comparison tests with other products.18 6
This implies a duty for an expert organization to perform compar-
ison tests even though the organization may have used the en-
dorsed product for an extended period with good results. An
example might be where a police department agrees to endorse a
particular type of automobile it has used for several months. No
longer are expert organizations free without restriction to state in
advertisements that they endorse any product.187
D. Consumer Endorsement Guide
The proposed 1972 Guide entitled "Consumer Endorsements"
simply stated that "[a] dvertisements employing endorsements by
a 'typical consumer', i.e., one who has no special expert
knowledge beyond normal use of the product, should in relating
facts about the endorser's experience with the product also reflect
the average and ordinary experience of consumers generally with
the product." 188 The relatively clear 1972 Guide, however, was
short-lived because another much more complex Guide was pro-
posed in 1975. Subsection (a) of the 1975 Guide89 embodied the
concept of the 1972 version, but also stated that if an atypical per-
formance of a product was depicted in an advertisement, then the
-upon its accumulation experience in evaluating cleansers without having
to have performed side-by-side or scientific comparisons.
1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.3.
186. Example 5: An association of professional athletes states in an adver-
tisement that it has "selected" a particular brand of beverages as its "offi-
cial breakfast drink." As in Example 4, the association would be regarded
as expert in the field of nutrition for purposes of this section, because con-
sumers would expect it to rely upon the selection of nutritious foods as
part of its business needs. Consequently, the association's endorsement
must be based upon an expert evaluation of the nutritional value of the
endorses beverage. Furthermore, unlike Example 4, the use of the words
"selected" and "official" in this endorsement imply that it was given only
after direct comparisons had been performed among competing brands.
Hence, the advertisement would be deceptive unless the association has
in fact performed such comparisons between the endorsed brand and its
leading competitors in terms of nutritional criteria, and the results of such
comparisons conform to the net impression created by the advertisement.
1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.3.
187. This Guide indicates that expert organizations have the duty to insure that
their endorsements are not misleading especially since organizational endorse-
ments will be held to a higher standard than those given by individuals. See notes
206-07 infra and accompanying text.
188. 1972 Guides, supra note 8, § 255.4.
189. 1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.2.
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advertisement must disclose conspicuously what typical perform-
ance would be. The FTC indicated that an excuse such as "[nlot
all consumers will get this result" would be insufficient. Appar-
ently the FTC was seeking affirmative disclosures' 90 as to what
could be expected rather than common disclaimers. This position
called into question disclaimers as to performance of products.
For example, if a consumer is shown washing very stained cloth-
ing in a washing machine to demonstrate the cleansing power of a
detergent, it would traditionally be acceptable for the advertise-
ment to use a disclaimer stating that consumers might not get the
same result. The 1975 Guide, however, would require that disclo-
sure be made of the actual results of the demonstration. Thus,
the advertisement would either have to show the consumer re-
moving partialy stained clothing or orally state that the detergent
would not completely remove the stain.
The AAAA was also concerned that subsection (a) of the 1975
Guide would reduce the effectiveness of consumer endorsements
that truthfully relate experiences with a product out of fear that
the public might be misled into expecting equivalent perform-
ance. 191 Accordingly, the 1980 Guide was changed to allow dis-
claimers to be used in addition to disclosures. However,
introductory remarks to the Guide make it clear that disclaimers
as to product performance must be prominent and integrated
with the endorsements, with the burden of proof being upon the
advertiser.192
190. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
191. 1975 AAAA COMMENTS, supra note 1, at 4.
192. The introductory remark is helpful in understanding the FTC's position:
Advertisers should understand that the Commission strongly favors
consumer endorsement that, in fact, depict a typical experience. However,
the Commission recognizes that a consumer endorsement representing a
non-typical experience with a clear disclaimer, or with a disclosure of
what is typical may not be deceptive. Generally, a disclaimer along proba-
bly will not be considered sufficient to dispel the representation that the
experience is typical, but because the Commission is not prepared to hold
that in every instance a bare disclaimer would be inadequate, reliance
thereon will not be considered a per se violation of Section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act. In any instance where only a disclaimer is
made, however, the advertiser should be certain that it is as prominent as,
and integrated with, the endorsement itself and that the circumstances
surrounding the endorsement itself and that the circumstances surround-
ing the endorsement minimize the message that it is a typical experience.
Advertisers should also know that a simple statement that "not all con-
sumers will get this result" or a similar disclaimer will not be considered
as adequate. The advertiser should realize, further, that the net effect of
the advertisement will be studied to determine if it has the capacity to
Subsection (b) to the proposed 1975 Guide193 required that if an
advertisement depicted persons as "actual consumers" who were
not consumers in fact, then the advertisement had to disclose that
it used professional actors appearing for compensation. Because.
of public comments submitted, the FTC subsequently determined
that its purpose of avoiding public deception might be served by a
less extensive means. The FTC realized that disclosure of the
fact that actors were being used might imply that the substance
of the advertisement was not genuine. 194 Had the 1975 disclosure
requirement been allowed to remain, not only might the public
have been misled to think that advertisements with the disclo-
sures were untrustworthy, but also advertisers themselves might
have suffered substantial profit losses.195 Therefore, under the
final 1980 Guide, disclosure must indicate only that the persons
depicted are not actual consumers; no mention need be made that
they are professional actors.196 This seems to be an attempt at
balancing the public's need to have accurate advertising informa-
tion with the harm which might result to advertisers under the
stricter 1975 standard. However, it must be noted that not only
did the FTC substantially alter its position concerning the re-
quirement that the use of professional actors had to be disclosed,
but also that the change came because of public comments sub-
mitted to the FTC. This demonstrates the potential danger that
the FTC can be insensitive to the needs of the marketplace and
consumers by requiring unrealistic measures.
Subsection (c), first proposed in 1975,197 required that claims
concerning the efficacy of drugs or related materials for use in
humans or animals may not be advertised by lay endorsement.
The AAAA referred to this as "singling out a class of products for
... draconian treatment" and stated that the proposed Guide
raised the serious question of the desirability of banning all lay
endorsements of over-the-counter drugs without regard to the
truthfulness of the endorsements.198 Introductory remarks to the
1975 Guide indicated that it was included at the suggestion of the
deceive. If the Commission has reason to believe that such a deception is
imparted by the consumer endorsement, the endorsement may be subject
to a Commission challenge.
1980 Guides, supra note 9, § 255.2(a).
193. 1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.2(b).
194. 1980 Guides, supra note 9, § 255.2, Introduction.
195. The losses to advertisers might have occurred either because of disclo-
sures that professional actors were being used or because less effective methods
of advertising might have been employed in order to avoid the "professional actor"
disclosure requirement.
196. 1980 Guides, supra note 9, § 255.2(b).
197. Id. at § 255.2(c).
198. 1975 AAAA COMMENTS, supra note 1, at 2.
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Lehigh Valley Committee Against Health Frauds.199 However,
the suggestion was submitted by the committee without any evi-
dentiary support.200 The committee's one page letter was submit-
ted without substantiation such as studies or cases which would
indicate that such a ban was warranted. The restrictive Guide
was included at the suggestion of one organization. This only
serves as further indication of the FTC's tendency to draft the
Guides without consultation of parties concerned and in narrow
and restrictive fashions.
Not suprisingly, subsection (c) released in its final form in
1980,201 was altered to permit lay endorsements of "any drug or
device" if the advertiser has adequate scientific substantiation for
the endorsement, and the endorsements are not contrary to Food
and Drug Administration determinations. The FTC, in its intro-
ductory remarks to the 1980 Guide, stated that it had determined
that the 1975 prohibition was unnecessary and that the public
could be adequately protected by compliance with the more re-
laxed 1980 Guide.202 The result is that advertisements can con-
tinue, within limits, to contain lay endorsements for drug
products.
Dramatic changes in the "Consumer Endorsements Guide,"
prior to it becoming final in 1980, clearly point out that industry
guides for endorsement advertising are difficult to formulate. In
just this Guide alone, the FTC completely changed its positions
with respect to disclosures of the use of professional actors 203 and
the use of consumers for drug endorsements. 2O4 Though public
comment periods brought in suggestions, which significantly
helped the FTC in formulating the final Guides, 2 05 there is yet no
assurance that the Guides in their present form accurately reflect
the best means by which to control endorsement abuses.
E. Endorsements by Organizations Guide
The Guide concerning organizational endorsements as pro-
199. 1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.2 Introduction.
200. 1975 AAAA COMMENTS, supra note 1, at 2.
201. 1980 Guides, supra NOTE 9, § 255.2(c).
202. Id. at Introduction.
203. See notes 193-95 supra and accompanying text.
204. See notes 197-02 supra and accompanying text.
205. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
posed in 1972206 stated that endorsements by groups could be
held to a more stringent standard of truthfulness than those of in-
dividuals, since organizations usually offer the collective judg-
ment of many people. The FTC felt such advertisements imply
that definite standards had been used by the group in the evalua-
tion of a product. The FTC, however, has given nothing to support
its underlying assumption that the buying public is more per-
suaded by organizational endorsements than those given by indi-
viduals.207
The final Guide, 208 released with little comment in 1975, added
that organizational endorsements must be based upon a process,
which ensures that the endorsements actually reflect the organi-
zation's collective judgment. Apparently, the FTC is trying to
avoid situations where one or few members of an organization
grant endorsements, which are not representative of the thinking
of the organization's members as a whole. The 1975 Guide also in-
dicates that if the organization is one which might be considered
an expert2o9 in a particular field, then it must utilize experts or
suitable standards for judging the relevant merits of the product
it wishes to endorse. An example of an endorsement by an expert
organization is approval of a toothpaste brand by an association
of dentists. The approval would, under the Guide, have to (1) be
based upon some type of objective evaluation of the toothpaste
according to dental standards, and (2) be based upon a process
which would accurately reflect the association's collective judg-
206. 1972 Guides, supra note 8, § 255.5.
207. This is another indication of the questionable foundation upon which the
endorsement Guides are based.
208. 1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.4.
Endorsements by organizations, especially expert ones, are viewed as
representing the judgment of a group whose collective experience exceeds
that of any individual member, and whose judgments are generally free of
the sort of subjective factors which vary from individual to individual.
Therefore, an organization's endorsement must be reached by a process
sufficient to ensure that the endorsement fairly reflects the collective judg-
ment of the organization. Moreover, if an organization is represented as
being expert, then, in conjunction with a proper exercise of its expertise
in evaluating the product under § 255.3 (Expert endorsements), it must
utilize an expert or experts recognized as such by the organization and
suitable for judging the relevant merits of such products.
Example: A mattress seller advertises that its product is endorsed by a
chiropractice [sc I association. Since the association would be regarded
as expert with respect to judging mattresses, its endorsement must be
supported by an expert evaluation by an expert or experts recognized as
such by the organization, or by compliance with standards previously
adopted by the organization and aimed at measuring the performance of
mattresses in general and not designed with the particular attributes of
the advertised mattress in mind.
Id.
209. The term "expert," as defined by the FTC, can encompass organizations.
See notes 206-10 supra and accompanying text.
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ment.210
The rigid requirements give rise to cause for concern. Because
of the liability imposed upon a "supposed" expert in the case of In
re Leroy Gordon Cooper,21 1 it is likely that expert organizations
will be more hesitant to publicly endorse products for fear of lia-
bility. If this occurs, consumers would lose the benefits which ac-
company product endorsements by professional or consumer
groups, and have less information with which to make purchase
decisions. Also, it is not likely that the Guides will add credibility
to endorsements given by organizations since credibility of such
endorsements does not appear to be a significant problem. 212
F. Criticism of the Endorsement Guides
The present FTC endorsement Guides present many difficult is-
sues, which raise questions as to the advisability of their contin-
ued existence. Two major factors, however, indicate that
alternatives to the Guides should be sought. First, the Guides ap-
pear in many areas to be excessively narrow and restrictive re-
garding both advertisers and endorsers. For example,
compensation given by an advertiser to a consumer endorser is
considered by the Guides to be a material connection requiring
disclosure. At the same time, however, compensation paid to a
celebrity or expert endorser need not be disclosed because it is
considered to be immaterial. 213 The basis for such a distinction is
questionable in theory and practice. What is required of the con-
sumer endorser who over time becomes known to the public so
that a celebrity status is obtained?214 What is to be made of the
difficult provision in the Guides that even nontangible forms of
payments to consumer endorsers, such as the opportunity to be
on television, must be disclosed?215 Another example of the nar-
rowness of the new Guides is demonstrated by the requirement
210. 1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.4
211. 94 F.T.C. 674 (1979).
212. Credibility problems with organizational endorsements usually arise only
when an advertiser falsely claims that his product has received an organization's
approval. See Mytinger & Casselberry, 57 F.T.C. 717 (1960), where the FDA was
falsely represented as endorsing the defendant's products. The FrC organiza-
tional endorsement Guide would not apply in such cases because no endorsement
is given.
213. 1980 Guides, supra note 9, § 255.5. See notes 163-65 supra and accompany-
ing text.
214. See generally 1980 Guides, supra note 9, § 255.5.
215. 1980 Guides, supra note 9, § 255.5.
that if an expert's endorsement gives the "net impression" that he
or she performed a comparison of the advertised product with
others, then such comparisons must have occurred. This provi-
sion, in effect, prohibits an expert from making any statements
about a product which cannot be demonstrated as being fac-
tual.2 16 This is especially restrictive when one considers that the
new Guides require that an expert conform his product evalua-
tions to what other experts with the same skill would do.217 One
also cannot overlook the fact that some of these requirements ap-
pear to be the original thinking of the FTC and not the result of
needs found in the marketplace or of requests from consumers.
The narrowness of the FTC Guides is also shown by the
number of significant changes which the FTC made in different
versions of the Guides. An excellent example is subsection (c) to
the 1975 "Consumer Endorsements Guide", which originally pro-
hibited all drug endorsements by lay persons.218 The FTC did a
complete about-face in the 1980 Guide, and apparently only due to
suggestions from the public.219 The fact that the FTC originally
took such a radical position and subsequently reversed itself
raises questions as to the criteria upon which the FTC based its
Guides. This also vividly points out that endorsement advertising
is not well adapted to narrow and restrictive controls. Rather,
broader definitions of proscribed acts are more likely to ensure
that the FTC does not unduly burden those in advertising. The
Guides, because of the narrowness of their language, indicate an
attitude of single-mindedness on the part of the FTC. It seems
that throughout the Guides there is a presumption that endorse-
ment advertising tends to be deceptive and harmful to the pub-
lic. 220 The Guides do not reflect solutions to problems which
actually exist, but rather they are evidence only of the FTC's
views.
The second factor which indicates that alternatives to the
Guides should be sought is that they do not have the force of
law.22 1 Because they are "industry guides," they are merely inter-
pretive of underlying FTC statutes and thus cannot be directly
used to prove that deceptive endorsements have occurred. This
creates two problems for the FTC. First, the burden of proof is
216. 1975 Guides, supra note 14, § 255.3. See notes 181-84 supra and accompany-
ing text.
217. See notes 174-75 supra and accompanying text.
218. 1980 Guides, supra note 9, § 255.2(c). See notes 197-205 supra and accom-
panying text.
219. See note 199 supra and accompanying text.
220. This is shown by endorsement Guides which do not seem to be responsive
to actual endorsement abuses. See note 212 supra and accompanying text.
221. See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
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very great which the FTC must meet to prove that an endorse-
ment is violative of the underlying statute.222 In this case, an en-
dorsement can be found deceptive only if the FTC can establish
that it is an "unfair or deceptive act or practice" within the mean-
ing of section 5 of the FTC Act.223 This leads to the second prob-
lem, which is that the Guides will not be used in actions brought
by the FTC against deceptive endorsement advertising.224 Since
the endorsement Guides do not have the force of law and the FTC
must prove violations of section 5, little good would come from
bringing the Guides into any legal action. This is an undesirable
result since the Guides will not have an opportunity for judicial
development; their parameters will not be explored and others
will not learn the level of acceptable conduct.
FTC trade regulation rules in place of the Guides would have a
much different result since actions could be brought directly for
their violation. For example, if the FTC were to pass a trade regu-
lation rule requiring disclosure of continuing payments to endors-
ers, then the FTC would be required in its complaint to establish
only that the disclosure should have been made and that the ad-
vertiser failed to do so. 2 2 5 This would considerably lighten the
burden of proof upon the FTC and at the same time allow others
potentially affected to know what could to be done to avoid simi-
lar problems.
The foregoing discussion indicates that the Guides in their
present form are ineffectively narrow. This, coupled with the fact
that they do not have the force of law, demonstrates that the en-
dorsement Guides do not represent the best means by which to
control endorsement abuses.
V. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF CONTROLLING
DECEPTIVE ENDORSEMENTS
The FTC endorsement Guides provide only one means of pro-
moting truthful endorsement advertising. Because of the limited
effectiveness of the Guides in correcting endorsement abuses, 22 6
other alternatives should be examined in an attempt to find a
222. See notes 78-82 supra and accompanying text.
223. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1976).
224. See notes 78-82 supra and accompanying text.
225. The FTC would not have to establish that any underlying statute was vio-
lated.
226. See notes 213-25 supra and accompanying text.
more desirable solution to the endorsement problem. This sec-
tion will discuss a broad range of possible solutions.
A. Private Causes Of Action
Private causes of action, as discussed here, refer to those ac-
tions brought by nongovernmental parties such as consumers or
business corporations. This discussion of private causes of action
will be divided into two portions, one dealing with actions typi-
cally brought by consumers and the other with those which would
be brought by competitors of the endorser.
It has been well established in consumer law that false adver-
tising claims which lie in tort are actionable where some type of
injury results from reliance upon those misrepresentations. 227
Deceit, perhaps the most common of such actions, requires that
the following elements be proven: (1) a false representation of
fact; (2) knowledge or belief on the part of the seller that the ad-
vertisement is false or knowledge that it is lacking a sufficient ba-
sis; (3) an intention to cause the buyer to act in reliance upon the
advertisement; (4) justifiable reliance by the buyer; and (5) dam-
ages caused by the reliance.228
The first element, a showing of false representation of fact, has
traditionally been the most difficult to prove in false advertising
actions, since the opinion or "puffing" of the seller is usually not
considered to be expression of fact. Even if it can be shown that
the representation was false, the consumer still must prove that
damages occurred. 229 Though this element may be very difficult
to establish in false advertising cases, it is not outside the realm
of possibility. The difficulties of proving the elements combined
with the typically high costs, both in time and money, however,
make this a relatively unattractive alternative for policing untrue
endorsements.
Other actions are also available to consumers in combating
false endorsements, though their use for this purpose has been
unsuccessful. These include tort claims such as invasion of pri-
vacy and both public and private nuisance. 230
Due to the foregoing problems making private suits against de-
ceptive advertisers impractical, some writers have advocated that
consumers should be allowed to bring private actions based upon
prior FTC administrative findings of violations of statutory
227. See generally G. ALEXANDER, COMMERCIAL TORTS 269-99 (1973).
228. D. EPsTEiN, supra note 75, at 22.
229. Id.
230. PRACTICING LAW INsTITUTE, supra note 64, at 337-41.
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duty.231 Such actions would be similar to those implied to inves-
tors under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for rule 1Ob-5232 vi-
olations. The FTC would determine the existence of a statutory
duty, which was breached, and then allow consumers to use that
finding as the basis for their action. The actions, however, have
traditionally been turned away on the ground that the FTC Act
did not imply private causes of action.233 Perhaps the best known
case of this sort is that of Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corpora-
tion,234 where a class action was denied against the manufacturer
of Excedrin for deceptive advertising. However, at least one case,
Guernsey v. Rich Plan,235 has allowed a private suit based upon a
failure of a business to comply with a cease and desist order
which the FTC had entered against it.
Competitors bringing actions for harm caused by deceptive en-
dorsements have several alternatives to consider, but few that of-
fer hope of success. One alternative which has been victorious is
based upon the broad tort of unfair competition. In Thomas A.
Edison, Inc. v. Shotkin,236 the defendent used the term "Certified
by Edison" in advertising electrical products. The plaintiffs, who
nationally sold electrical products under the name of Edison, suc-
cessfully argued that the defendent's acts were deceptive and that
they constituted unfair competition.
It is also possible for a business competitor to bring the tort ac-
tion of passing off. In one case,237 a mattress manufacturer, who
rightly promoted his products as being advertised in Life maga-
zine and as having the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval, suc-
cessfully brought an action against another mattress
manufacturer who falsely claimed to have the same "endorse-
ments."
An action for disparagement 238 might also lie where one dam-
ages the property interests of another's reputation. For exam-
231. See, e.g., Private Judicial Remedies for False and Misleading Advertising,
25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 747 (1974).
232. 17 C.F.R. § 240.0-1-.31-1 (1980); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
233. See F. MILLER & B. CLARK, supra note 63, at 13; Schulman, Little F.T.C. Act:
The Neglected Alternative, 9 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. PRoc. 351, 366 (1975).
234. 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
235. 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
236. 69 F. Supp. 176 (D. Colo. 1946), appeal dismissed, 163 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 813 (1947).
237. Friedman v. Sealy, Inc. 274 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1959).
238. E. KIuTER, PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 140-41 (2d ed.
1978).
ple, 239 an advertiser marketed air conditioners claiming they were
rated as the "best buy" by an independent research organization,
Consumer Reports magazine, the plaintiff, successfully objected
to the advertisement's misleading statement that it had endorsed
the advertiser's air conditioners. In reality, the products were
only comparatively evaluated with those made by competitors.
Despite the existence of the common causes of action discussed
above, problems of proof and defenses have made them seldom
successful. Requirements such as standing, causation, special
damages, as well as the high costs of litigation, have made private
causes of action unattractive alternatives for the control of decep-
tive advertising.240
B. State Causes Of Action
Early in this century, many states adopted versions of
"Printer's Ink" statutes, which generally provided misdemeanor
penalties for untrue, deceptive, or misleading advertisements.
The statutes proved to be largely ineffective in curbing deceptive
endorsements, primarily due to reluctance on the part of prosecu-
tors to institute criminal proceedings for such violations. 241
Certain states, such as California, have taken steps to provide
more effective remedies for deceptive advertising. In 1972, Cali-
fornia Business and Professions Code section 17535242 was en-
acted, which permits any city attorney, district attorney, or the
attorney general to seek whatever equitable relief the courts
deem necessary to prevent deceptive advertising. The statute in-
creases the possibility that state or city actions can be brought for
deceptive advertising. For example in 1980, the San Francisco dis-
trict attorney's office began investigations to determine whether
athlete Bruce Jenner actually used Wheaties breakfast cereal as
part of his training diet as he has so often indicated when endors-
ing the product.243
Another inventive avenue is being explored which offers poten-
tial for control of deceptive advertising at the state level. This is
commonly referred to as the "Little" 244 or "Baby" 245 FTC Act. At
least two states, Illinois and Texas, have enacted legislation pat-
terned after the FTC Act which explicitly provide for private
239. Consumers Union of the United States v. Admiral Corp., 186 F. Supp. 800
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
240. E. KINTER, supra note 238, at 139-41.
241. D. EPSTEIN, supra note 75, at 24-25.
242. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17535 (West Supp. 1980).
243. FTC: Celebrities Must Use Products They Pitch, 66 A.B.A.J. 274 (1980).
244. Schulman, supra note 233, at 545.
245. F. MILLER & B. CLARi, supra note 63, at 13.
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causes of action against those using deceptive advertisements.
The Texas statute allows courts to award damages and attorneys
in the private suits.246
State laws are traditionally regarded as inadequate in dealing
with deceptive advertising.247 Though efforts are made to provide
increased consumer protection, 248 it is not likely that state laws
will be able to adequately meet the challenge. The best hope for
curbing advertisement abuses lies with the nation's most power-
ful advertising standards enforcer, the FTC.
C. Alternative FTC Approaches To Endorsement Advertising
The limited effectiveness of the present endorsement Guides in
preventing deceptive endorsements 249 coupled with difficulties in
private 250 and state25 ' actions indicates that the primary burden
for providing effective solutions to endorsement abuses still rests
with the FTC. Several alternatives should be considered. First,
and most importantly, the FTC could abolish its present endorse-
ment Guides and replace them with trade regulation rules. 25 2
This would have the effect of establishing FTC rules concerning
endorsing, which would have the force of law.253 The trade regu-
lation rules should indicate to all what would be required by the
FTC in endorsement advertising. The rules would be utilized in
FTC and court cases and therefore be molded to fit the changing
needs of consumers and advertisers. However, along with estab-
lishing trade regulation rules, the FTC should change its empha-
sis from specifying narrow, unneeded requirements 25 4 to instead
providing broad, clear standards, which address real advertising
issues. Following this approach, the FTC could formulate the le-
gal parameters within which advertisers would be required to
work while providing administrative law judges and courts with
latitude to encounter newly arising situations.
The second viable alternative for controlling endorsement
abuses is through the use of FTC-directed civil redress actions
246. Id.
247. E. KINrER, supra note 238, at 55.
248. See notes 241-46 supra and accompanying text.
249. See notes 213-25 supra and accompanying text.
250. See notes 227-40 supra and accompanying text.
251. See notes 241-48 supra and accompanying text.
252. See notes 83-87 supra and accompanying text.
253. See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
254. See notes 213-25 supra and accompanying text.
under the Magnuson-Moss Act.255 The FTC could demonstrate
that it is willing and able to move against violating endorsers and
advertisers with its full strength, utilizing cease and desist orders,
civil penalties, and lawsuits to obtain civil redress for individuals
or for a class.256 In so doing, the FTC would at once prevent de-
ceptive endorsements and provide consumers with compensation
for their losses. However, implementation of an FTC policy favor-
ing aggressive civil redress actions is not foreseen, especially in
light of traditional FTC policies 25 7 and limited finances under the
Reagan administration, as will be discussed below.258
VI. IMPACT OF THE NEW FTC ENDORSEMENT GUIDES
The FTC Endorsement Guides present significant implications
which should be considered. Perhaps foremost is the signal to ad-
vertisers and endorsers that the FTC intends to police more
closely advertising abuses. The trend of the FTC toward active
regulation of advertising has been clear since FTC v. R.F. Keppel
& Bros.2 5 9 However, it was not until the 1978 decision of In re
Cooga Mooga 26O that the full extent of the FTC's powers became
evident. In re Cooga Mooga, which imposed personal liablity
upon an endorser, might be considered as a product of the FTC
endorsement Guides, even though they were never mentioned in
the decision, because both the 1972 and 1975 Guides had already
been released prior to institution of the Cooga Mooga action.
The primary goal of the FTC endorsement Guides is to prevent
the deception of consumers by deceptive endorsement advertis-
ing. Advertisers and endorsers alike will almost undoubtedly re-
spond with caution.261 However, one matter that remains to be
seen is whether the Guides, with the passage of time, will actually
reduce the magnitude of deceptive endorsement advertising. Sev-
eral factors stand in the way of the FTC successfully accomplish-
ing its goal. First, it is almost impossible for one governmental
agency to police any but the most serious of all endorsement vio-
lations due to the enormous number of endorsement advertise-
ments262 and the limited size of the FTC staff. This consideration
255. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1976).
256. See Note, supra note 66, at 259.
257. Id. at 258.
258. See note 263 infra and accompanying text.
259. 291 U.S. 304 (1934). In Keppel, the Supreme Court relaxed the require-
ment that FTC jurisdiction could exist only where harm to competition was
shown.
260. 92 F.T.C. 310 (1928). See notes 115-19 supra and accompanying text.
261. Jones, Celebrity Endorsements: A Case for Alarm and Concern for the Fu-
ture, 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 521, 544 (1980).
262. By one estimate, almost one out of every three television commercials
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is most important in light of federal budget cutbacks proposed by
the Reagan administration.263 It is unlikely that the FrC will ex-
perience significant growth in the coming years so that it will be
almost impossible for it to aggressively monitor endorsement ad-
vertising. Civil redress actions under the Magnuson-Moss Act 26 4
will also be less likely to be used for exactly the same reason.
Thus, it seems that a more active role of the FTC in bringing its
own actions or lawsuits against advertising violators is unlikely.
The second factor which will hinder eradication of endorsement
problems will be resistance from those in the advertising indus-
try. Although it is assumed that most people agree in principle
with the Guides, reality would indicate that acceptance of the
Guides will be less than universal. 265 Even those who do not have
propensities to violate laws may be offended by the narrow and
technical Guides. The very nature of the Guides themselves in-
vites evasion of their parameters since the FTC has entered an
area of regulation which is difficult to control with exacting re-
quirements. This, coupled with the fact that the Guides do not
have the force of law,266 leads to the conclusion that ultimately
they will have little impact upon the advertising industry. As sug-
gested earlier, replacement of the present Guides with trade regu-
lation rules2 67 which are broader in scope and have the force of
law could do much to ensure compliance from advertisers and en-
dorsers.268 However, the FrC has given no indication that this
change is likely to occur so that it can be assumed the Guides will
remain for the foreseeable future. This means that endorsement
abuses will almost certainly continue unchecked until the FTC re-
sorts to an alternative form of regulation.
In light of the foregoing, one can have little hope of seeing sig-
nificant improvements in the control of deceptive and misleading
uses a celebrity. Id. at 525. This does not even include non-celebrity endorsers
such as experts, consumers, and organizations.
263. See NEWSWEEK, Mar. 2, 1981, at 22-34; Los Angeles Daily Journal, Mar. 4,
1981, § 1, at 6, col. 6.
264. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1976). Significant use of the civil redress provisions of
the Magnuson-Muss Act would require concentrations of both time and money.
See generally Note, supra note 66.
265. See, e.g., notes 197-98 supra and accompanying text.
266. See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
267. See notes 83-87 supra and accompanying text.
268. The fact that violation of the trade regulation rules could be punished
would be a strong incentive for advertisers and endorsers to pay heed to their re-
quirements.
advertising. The FTC's new endorsement Guides will do little, if
anything, to provide needed solutions, so that consumers will con-
tinue to be victimized by the unscrupulous. Clearly, then, there is
a need for the FTC to develop alternatives which both effectively
penalize violators and protect consumers.269
In developing alternatives to the new Guides, the FTC must not
forget that businesses have legitimate interests in being free to
promote themselves without being unnecessarily fettered by gov-
ernmental controls. Concerns for limiting the paternalistic atti-
tudes of governments toward their citizenry are not without
merit. First amendment free speech, even though commercial, is
also a very important concern in formulating any endorsement
controls.270
Serious interests are at stake in the endorsement advertising
question. The most effective methods for controlling abuses in
such advertising are yet to be implemented. Whatever those
methods might be, whether trade regulation rules,271 civil redress
actions, 272 or other alternatives, they must also be rational in light
of the many competing demands.
VII. CONCLUSION
The introduction of Guides pertaining to endorsement advertis-
ing marks an important event in advertising history and FTC con-
trol of trade. The FTC, following a history of gradually increasing
power over deceptive advertising,273 has promulgated its Guides
in an effort to provide advertisers and endorsers with standards
by which their advertisements can be measured. However, in-
stead of furthering the purported goal of reducing deceptive prac-
tices in advertising, the Guides are likely to have little impact
since they are too narrowly drafted 27 4 and do not have the force of
law.
Closer examination of alternatives to the new Guides is en-
couraged so that other solutions may be implemented which more
effectively meet consumers' needs for protection from deceptive
269. See notes 213-25 supra and accompanying text.
270. See generally Knapp, Commercial Speech, the Federal Trade Commission
and the First Amendment, 9 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1978); Constitutional Law-
First Amendment-Freedom of Speech--Commercial Speech and Advertising, 12
AKRON L. REV. 300 (1978); Prior Restraints and Restrictions on Advertising After
Virginia Pharmacy Board. The Commercial Speech Doctrine Reformulated, 43
Miss. L. REV. 64 (1978).
271. See notes 83-87 supra and accompanying text.
272. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
273. See notes 29-47 supra and accompanying text.
274. See notes 213-25 supra and accompanying text.
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endorsement practices while also recognizing the competing in-
terests of free enterprise.
WHITNEY F. WASHBURN

